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power plants. The Ministry of Trade and Industry requested the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authori-
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STUK deems, how the proposed disposal concept, site and facility comply with the safety requirements
included in the Government's Decision (478/1999).
STUK's preliminary safety appraisal was supported by contributions from a number of outside experts.
A collective opinion by an international group of ten distinguished experts is appended to this report.
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On May 26, 1999, Posiva Ltd submitted to the
Government an application, pursuant to the Nu-
clear Energy Act, for a Decision in Principle (DiP)
on a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel from
the Finnish nuclear power plants. The facility is
proposed to be located at a site in the vicinity of
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. That site is one
of the four sites where detailed site investigations
have been carried out.
In accordance with the Section 12 of the Nucle-
ar Energy Act, the Ministry of Trade and Industry
must obtain a preliminary safety appraisal from
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) on the application for DiP. According to
Section 14 of the Nuclear Energy Act, before
making a DiP the Government shall ascertain,
that no factors have arisen indicating lack of
sufficient prerequisites for constructing the dis-
posal facility so that it is safe; it shall not cause
injury to people, or damage the environment or
property.
The Ministry of Industry has requested for
STUK’s preliminary safety appraisal in a letter
dated on June 24, 1999. STUK’s position on the
DiP application is given in this statement. The
appended safety appraisal judges, how the pro-
posed disposal facility, disposal concept and the
disposal site comply with the safety requirements
included in the Government Decision on the safe-
ty of disposal of spent nuclear fuel (478/1999,
dated March 25, 1999). STUK’s preliminary safety
appraisal is supported by contributions from a
number of outside experts. The statement by the
Advisory Committee for Nuclear Safety, dealing
STUK’S STATEMENT TO THE MINISTRY
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
with the DiP application and STUK’s preliminary
safety appraisal, is also appended.
The research, development and planning
work related to disposal of spent fuel has
progressed so that adequate basis exists for
the consideration of the DiP
The preparatory works for spent fuel disposal has
been conducted in accordance with the target
schedule decided by the Government in 1983 and
confirmed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
last time in 1995.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, a DiP is
required for a disposal facility of nuclear waste,
and the explanatory memorandum of the Act clari-
fies that a disposal project should be submitted to
the Government in an early phase. The Govern-
ment would then decide whether the project is in
line with the overall good of the society and
accordingly, whether the continuation of the
project is justified.
Research and development work on spent fuel
disposal has been conducted in Finland during
twenty years. Acquisition of the required further
knowledge to ensure safety calls for research work
at the planned disposal depths and conditions, in
addition to the continuation of investigations
made from ground surface.
Construction of an underground research facil-
ity implies large investments by the applicant,
Posiva Ltd. STUK will not take a stand on the
relation of these investments to the provision of
Section 15 of the Nuclear Energy Act and Section
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30 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, which limit the
applicant’s investments prior to the acceptance of
the DiP. Nevertheless, STUK deems that continu-
ous research work and construction of the under-
ground research facility is important from the
standpoint of safety.
In order to benefit from the further studies as
much as possible, the underground research facili-
ty should be constructed at the site which is
currently regarded as the most suitable one.
The investigations made thus far suggest
that Olkiluoto is a suitable disposal site
In the review work made by STUK and its outside
experts, no such geological factors emerged, which
would support selection of some other site than
Olkiluoto as the disposal site.
Given the other favourable characteristic of the
Olkiluoto site (minimisation of transports, possi-
bility of sea transports and already existing local
infrastructure), STUK deems justified to focus the
further investigations at Olkiluoto.
Operation of a disposal facility poses
no significant safety hazards
The DiP application include a preliminary design
of the disposal facility, consisting of an above-
ground encapsulation facility and an underground
facility with auxiliary facilities. In the planning
work, much attention has been given to the deter-
mination of the safety related design bases for the
facility. In STUK’s view, these preliminary plans
are appropriate and adequate in the present
phase.
The disposal facility is predominantly based on
proven technology. However, the manufacturing
technology of the waste canister and its quality
control require substantial further engineered de-
velopment work.
The safety assessments for the operation of the
disposal facility and for the transportation of
spent fuel demonstrate sufficiently compliance
with the safety requirements. Experiences from
transports of spent fuel already exist abundantly,
for instance in Sweden.
The safety of spent fuel transportation, encap-
sulation and disposal operations will mainly be
based on inherently safe systems and these activi-
ties involve no potential for a severe accidents
leading to environmental pollution.
Studies have strengthened the view that
the safety objectives for the very long time
perspective can be met
Reliable containment of the disposed spent fuel
from the biosphere is intended to be ensured by
means of a multiple barrier system. The long-term
safety of disposal is justified by a safety assess-
ment, which is supported by comprehensive stud-
ies made during two decades.
These studies, reviewed by STUK, and the
publicly financed independent research work have
strengthened the view that the established safety
requirements can be met with considerable mar-
gins. The barriers are likely to retain their per-
formance capability as long as required for the
containment of the radioactive substances. The
failure of barriers due to natural events, such as
post-glacial rock displacement, or human actions,
would neither lead to severe environmental conse-
quences.
In the review reports and expert statements
acquired by STUK, the suitability of the disposal
concept is not questioned, or no other reasons for
rejecting the DiP application are put forward.
More research and development work is
needed for the support of the construction
licence application
As clarified in the appended STUK’s preliminary
safety appraisal, the safety of disposal has not yet
been demonstrated with the certainty as to be re-
quired for a construction licence application. Un-
certainties and need for development are included
in many of the relevant areas: the fabrication of
waste canister, the long-term performance of engi-
neered barriers, the characteristics of the pro-
posed disposal site and the methodology of safety
assessment.
The intensive research and development peri-
od of about ten years, proposed by Posiva, seems
appropriate for resolving the open issues.
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The proposed disposal concept provides
a better approach for the containment of
spent fuel than the other known alternatives
Alternatives for spent fuel management are dis-
cussed in STUK’s statement (August 20, 1999) on
Posiva’s environmental impact assessment report.
The statement concludes that disposal of spent
fuel into bedrock is the alternative which involves
least uncertainties in the Finnish circumstances.
An essential feature of Posiva’s disposal con-
cept is that in all parts it can be implemented by
domestic efforts. This is consistent with the spirit
of the Amendment of 1994 of the Nuclear Energy
Act: our national responsibility is to take care of
the waste that is produced in Finland.
Another strength of the concept is that the
basic principles are applicable and necessary not-
withstanding the type of nuclear waste. This fact
minimises the need for further modifications in
case that the international research and develop-
ment work would result in new technical innova-
tions.
The essential features of the concept include:
• The multiple barrier principle, ensuring almost
unaltered level of safety if a single barrier
failed;
• The elimination of a possibility of sudden and
widespread releases of radioactive substances;
• The inaccessibility of the repository and the
absence of need for monitoring in the post-
closure period.
The disposal concept allows improvements,
if substantial innovations would emerge in
future
The international research and development work
has not produced any revolutionary innovations
during the two decades when the preparatory
work for spent fuel disposal has been conducted in
Finland. Nevertheless, the possibility of innova-
tions cannot be completely ruled out and, for in-
stance, new methods may emerge for decreasing
the amount of waste to be disposed of or for fur-
ther improvement of conditioning of the waste.
The prospects offered by future development
should be assessed regularly in the course of the
planning work and particularly during the con-
struction and operating licence processes.
Evidently, the innovations can be flexibly uti-
lised for modifying of the disposal concept, if the
safety or economy of disposal can thereby be
enhanced. No foreseeable innovation will, howev-
er, eliminate the need for disposal of high-level
waste.
Development of an essentially different
concept for the management of spent fuel
would be expected only with fast global
growth of the use of nuclear energy
In most of the countries where nuclear energy is
used, principally similar disposal facilities as the
one proposed by Posiva, are under development. A
common feature is waste disposal deep into bed-
rock, either spent fuel as such or the high-level
reprocessing waste arising from the spent fuel.
The engineered concepts vary depending on the
selected conditioning process and the available ge-
ological media.
Currently, no such circumstances can be fore-
seen, which would steer this congruent develop-
ment towards an entirely new track.
Development of essentially different kind of
concepts for spent fuel management would re-
quire vast efforts. Allocation of resources in them
would be justified only in case that rapid global
growth of the use of nuclear energy would take
place and the spent fuel, which is currently de-
clared as waste, would be needed as raw material
for fresh fuel. This kind of growth would call for
adoption of new reactor types, which are able to
utilise uranium more efficiently than the present
ones. The development of such reactors has, how-
ever, substantially declined and is currently ap-
proaching the level of basic research.
Irrespective of the future development, some
kind of deep repository would be needed, provided
that the countries having reprocessing facilities
will return to the producer the high-level waste
arising from the process.
From the Finnish perspective, it is not prudent
to wait for the potential global growth of the use of
nuclear energy with the adoption of novel reactor
types. Anyway, this kind of development is beyond
the influence of Finnish organisations involved
with nuclear energy.
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A safe disposal solution has to be developed
in the time period when the required
technical and scientific expertise is still
available
The best way to ensure the safety of the disposal
facility and the reliable isolation of nuclear waste
from the biosphere is to implement the research
and development work, and the design, construc-
tion and commissioning of a disposal facility in a
continuous process.
The DiP is an important interim milestone
allowing to continue the preparatory works for
disposal and to create preparedness for the appli-
cation of a construction licence.
If the process aiming at commissioning of a
disposal facility slows down substantially or will
be suspended, it is evidently difficult to retain or
reacquire the expertise needed for the continua-
tion of the disposal project. This is true in particu-
lar if no continuation for the use of nuclear energy
is foreseen after the shut-down of the existing
nuclear power plants. It is likely that the decline
in expertise will take place in near future, if the
nuclear field will not offer attractive prospects for
the young generation.
A delay in the preparatory works would in-
volve, besides the falling-off in quality of the
technical and scientific works, significant addi-
tional costs and need for increasing the funds for
nuclear waste management.
Retrieval of the disposed waste and
adoption of a new spent fuel management
concept is feasible in each phase of the
disposal program
The proposed concept allows the retrieval of waste
in any phase of the disposal project, even in the
post-closure phase. It is, however, highly unlikely
that safety aspects would trigger the retrieval of
disposed waste.
The most likely reason for retrieval of waste
would be such global development that makes the
disposed waste attractive as raw material for
nuclear fuel, and the economical profitability of
retrieval would then be a crucial factor.
STUK concludes that the DiP is currently
justified from the safety point of view
In STUK’s preliminary safety appraisal no factors
were discovered, which would indicate lack of suf-
ficient prerequisites for constructing the disposal
facility in compliance with the safety require-
ments included in the Government Decision of
March 25, 1999. Consequently the prerequisites
for a DiP, included in the Nuclear Energy Act, are
met from the nuclear safety point of view.
The DiP should be associated with a require-
ment for research and development work for en-
suring adequately the safety of the disposal con-
cept prior to the construction licence phase. The
procedures for the planning and surveillance of
the further preparatory works should appropri-
ately be established by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry in a decision pursuant to Section 28 of
the Nuclear Energy Act.
The continuation of the disposal process in
accordance with the DiP, or the need for the
amendment of the DiP if required due to future
world-wide development, can be considered in
several phases. Such important decision-making
milestones are the construction licence decision by
the Government earliest in 2010, the operating
licence decision by the Government earliest in
2020 and the decision on the closure of the dispos-
al facility earliest in the mid-century.
Director General Jukka Laaksonen
Director Tero Varjoranta
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an underground research facility at the selected
disposal site.
In accordance with the Section 12 of the Nucle-
ar Energy Act, the Ministry of Trade and Industry
must obtain a preliminary safety appraisal from
STUK on the application for DiP. This request is
included in Ministry's letter dated on June 24,
1999.
STUK's preliminary safety appraisal is pre-
sented in this report. It is based on the Govern-
ment Decision on the safety of disposal of spent
nuclear fuel (478/1999, dated March 25, 1999). In
the beginning of each topical chapter of this re-
port, the relevant safety requirements included in
the Government Decision, are quoted. Some of
these requirements are specified mainly on the
basis of STUK's YVL Guide under preparation. In
each chapter, the safety requirements are followed
by a judgement of how compliance with these
safety requirements are demonstrated in the DiP
application and in its most important reference
reports.
The preliminary safety appraisal is supported
by contributions from a number of outside ex-
perts. STUK has obtained statements on the safe-
ty aspects of the DiP application from the Techni-
cal Research Centre of Finland, Geological Survey
of Finland, Laboratory of Engineering Geology
and Geophysics/Helsinki University of Technology
and Radiochemical Laboratory/Helsinki Universi-
ty. These statements are enclosed (Apps. 1–4).
STUK also engaged an international group of ten
distinguished experts to review Posiva's safety
reports. A collective opinion by this expert group is
given in Appendix 5 and Appendices 6–14 include
nine topical reports by members of the same
group. Furthermore, STUK has obtained judge-
ments on the manufacturing technology and long-
term performance of the copper-iron canister from
the experts of the Manufacturing Technology/
Technical Research Centre of Finland (Apps. 15–
16).
On May 26, 1999, Posiva Ltd submitted to the
Government an application, pursuant to the Nu-
clear Energy Act, for a Decision in Principle (DiP)
on a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel from
the Finnish nuclear power plants. The facility is
proposed to be located at a site in the vicinity of
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. That site is one
of the four sites where detailed site investigations
have been carried out.
The disposal concept proposed in the DiP appli-
cation has been the focus of research and develop-
ment work performed in Finland during the past
twenty years. The objectives for this work were
originally defined in the Government Decision of
1983, including the following target schedule:
• Interim progress reporting in 1985 and 1992
• Preparedness for the selection of a disposal site
by the end of 2000
• Preparedness for the construction licence ap-
plication by the end of 2010
• Preparedness for the commencement of dispos-
al operations as of 2020.
The preparatory works for spent fuel disposal
were initially carried out by Teollisuuden Voima
Ltd and since 1996 by Posiva Ltd. These prepara-
tions have so far progressed in accordance with
the target schedule. Summary reports on disposal
facility design, safety of disposal and disposal site
selection were published in 1985, 1992 and 1996
and were subsequently reviewed by the Radiation
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). In 1993 an
expert group, built up by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (so called WATRP Review Team),
evaluated the Finnish spent fuel disposal program
(KTM 1994). In these reviews, the continuation of
the disposal program was not questioned.
Subsequent to the DiP, if to be made, and prior
to the submittal of the construction licence to the
Government, Posiva intends to carry out a re-
search and development program, which lasts
about ten years and includes e.g. construction of
STUK's Preliminary Safety Appraisal
1 INTRODUCTION
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Safety requirements
In accordance with section 6 of the Nuclear Ener-
gy Act, nuclear waste generated in connection with
or as a result of the use of nuclear energy in Fin-
land shall be handled, stored and permanently
disposed of in Finland. In accordance with section
76 of the Nuclear Energy Decree when a decision
is made on the principles that form the basis for
the waste management obligation, the decision
must be based on the premise that the nuclear
waste can be transferred beyond Finland's juris-
diction for good or that it can be placed into Finn-
ish ground or bedrock.
Section 7 of the Government Decision
(478/1999) includes the following requirements:
The implementation of disposal, as a whole,
shall be planned with due regard to safety. The
planning shall take account of the decrease of the
activity of spent fuel by interim storage and the
utilisation of best available technology and scien-
tific knowledge. However, the implementation of
disposal shall not be unnecessarily delayed.
Disposal shall be planned so that no monitor-
ing of the disposal site is required for ensuring
long-term safety and so that retrievability of the
waste canisters is maintained to provide for such
development of technology that makes it a pre-
ferred option.
Subsequent to the selection of a disposal site,
implementation of spent fuel disposal includes the
following phases:
• Construction of an underground research facil-
ity;
• Construction of an encapsulation facility, auxil-
iary facilities and waste emplacement rooms;
• Encapsulation of spent fuel bundles and trans-
fer of waste canisters into their deposition
positions;
• Closure of emplacement rooms and other un-
derground rooms;
• Post-closure monitoring, if required.
These phases, which can be partly parallel, should
be scheduled and implemented with due regard to
long-term safety. In doing so, the following aspects
should be considered:
• Reduction of the activity and heat generation
in waste prior to disposal;
• Introduction of the best available technique or
a technique that is becoming available;
• Acquisition of adequate experimental knowl-
edge of the disposal site and other components
of the disposal systems affecting long-term
safety;
• Potential surveillance actions related to ensur-
ing the long-term safety or to non-proliferation
of nuclear materials;
• Need for preserving the retrievability of dis-
posed waste;
• Aim of preserving the natural features of the
host rock and other favourable conditions in
the repository;
• Aim of limiting the hazards and other burdens
to future generations due to long-term storage
of waste.
Retrievability means that even in the post-closure
phase, it is possible to retrieve the waste canisters
from the repository. In practice, retrievability will
be limited to a time period when the engineered
barriers provide an effective containment of the
disposed radioactive substances. The disposal con-
cept should be such that retrieval of waste canis-
ters, if needed, is technically feasible with reason-
able resources. Facilitation of retrievability or po-
tential post-closure surveillance actions should
not impair the long-term safety.
2 WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION AND
SCHEDULING OF DISPOSAL
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Compliance with the safety requirements
The proposed disposal concept is based on encap-
sulation of the fuel bundles, cooled down for at
least 20 years, hermetically into composite con-
tainers of iron and copper. The waste canisters are
emplaced into deposition holes where they are
lined by bentonite clay (the buffer). The deposition
holes are located in a wide network of tunnels at
the depth of 400–700 m in bedrock. This disposal
concept has been subject to extensive research and
development work for about 20 years particularly
in Sweden and Finland.
The overall disposal program put forward by
Posiva, proposing commence the construction of
the disposal facility and its commissioning around
2010 and 2020 respectively, is based on the target
schedule decided by the Government in 1983 and
confirmed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
last time in 1995. The shut-down of the disposal
facility will be made, according to the DiP applica-
tion, in 2040 at the earliest and in 2100 at the
latest depending on how long nuclear energy will
be generated in Finland. The application includes
provisions for disposal of spent fuel from two
additional nuclear power plants, besides the exist-
ing ones.
After the DiP, Posiva intends to construct an
underground research facility at the selected dis-
posal site. STUK and its international review
team (App. 5) consider this as an appropriate step
for obtaining experimental data for ensuring the
safety and the suitability of the disposal site.
The later steps of Posiva’s overall schedule
should not be regarded as definite ones. With good
reasons, construction and commissioning of the
disposal facility may be delayed. The way of tech-
nical implementation of disposal is also broadly
defined in the DiP application and may conse-
quently be modified, as necessary.
Retrievability was originally not adopted as a
design basis for the disposal concept. Posiva has
reported on the feasibility of retrieval of waste
canisters during the operational period and in the
post-closure phase (Saanio&Raiko, 1999). The re-
port concludes that retrieval is feasible with rea-
sonable efforts and that the required technology is
similar to that to be used in the construction and
operation of the disposal facility.
Post-closure surveillance means monitoring of
the disposed waste e.g. for ensuring the safety or
for discovering any diversion of the nuclear mate-
rials. Such surveillance actions are not specified
in Posiva’s disposal plans. In case of crystalline,
saturated host rock, it seems not possible to adopt
a disposal concept that would allow direct moni-
toring of the disposed waste canisters, without
impairing the safety. Consequently, surveillance of
e.g. nuclear materials must be based on indirect
methods intended to discover intrusion into the
sealed repository.
If so desired in due course, some of the main
tunnels and shafts of the disposal facility may be
kept open after the operational period in order to
monitor the repository and to facilitate retrieva-
bility, although the waste emplacement rooms
should be backfilled without unnecessary delays.
In STUK’s view, the scheduling and way of
implementation of Posiva’s disposal plan includes
flexibility to such extent that the pertinent safety
requirements can be taken into account.
12
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3.1 General design principles
Safety requirements
Sections 11–16 of the Government Decision
(478/1999) include the following requirements:
To ensure the operational safety of the disposal
facility and the long-term safety,
(1) proven or otherwise carefully examined and
high-quality technology shall be employed;
(2) advanced quality assurance programmes
shall be obeyed; and
(3) advanced safety culture shall be maintained
in the design, construction, operation and clo-
sure of the disposal facility.
Operating experience from the disposal facility
shall be systematically followed and assessed. For
further safety enhancement, such actions shall be
taken that can be regarded as justified considering
operating experiences and the results of safety
research as well as the progress in science and
technology.
The systems, structures and components of the
disposal facility shall be classified on the basis of
their importance to the operational safety and to
the long-term safety of the disposal facility. Their
quality level and the inspections and tests required
to ascertain and verify the quality level shall be
adequate considering the importance to safety of
the item concerned.
The functions at the disposal facility that are
important to the maintenance of the integrity of
fuel bundles and waste canisters, prevention of
radioactive releases and to the radiation protection
of the personnel shall be ensured.
Technical and administrative requirements and
restrictions for ensuring the operational and long-
term safety shall be set forth in the technical safety
specifications of the disposal facility. Appropriate
instructions shall exist for the operation, mainte-
nance, regular in-service inspections and periodic
tests as well as for transient and accident condi-
tions. The reliable function of systems and compo-
nents shall be ensured by adequate maintenance
and by regular in-service inspections and periodic
tests.
The personnel at the disposal facility shall be
suitable for their duties, qualified and well
trained. The competence of the personnel shall be
maintained and enhanced through training pro-
grammes.
Compliance with the safety requirements
Some of the safety requirements included in the
Government Decision are of such character that
compliance with them should be judged not yet in
the DiP phase but in the later licensing phases.
Such requirements are in particular those con-
cerning technical safety specifications, operation-
al instructions, regular in-service inspections and
periodic tests, qualification of personnel and fol-
low-up of operating experience.
The disposal facility consists of an aboveground
facility, which includes e.g. rooms for reception of
spent fuel and for its encapsulation (the so called
encapsulation facility), and an underground net-
work of tunnels, where encapsulated spent fuel
(waste canisters) will be emplaced.
The DiP application and the supporting Posi-
va’s reports (Kukkola 1999b, Kukkola 1999c) in-
clude a preliminary design of the encapsulation
facility. This design is, to a great extent, based on
proven technology already in use, although in
certain parts of the facility the technology is such
that it does not exist in Finland or it is still under
development.
Handling of spent fuel bundles in the hot cell’s
atmosphere lacks practical experiences in Finland
but, on the other hand, at reprocessing plants
3 DESIGN BASIS FOR THE DISPOSAL
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handling of spent fuel bundles is by far more
demanding than the planned operations at the
encapsulation facility. Furthermore, in the past
decade dry storages for spent fuel, where handling
of fuel bundles resemble to that in Posiva’s design,
have come into common use.
The manufacturing, sealing and inspection
technology of copper containers are currently sub-
ject to intensive research and development work
both in Finland and Sweden and significant
progress has been achieved during the past few
years. Posiva has recently completed the fabrica-
tion of the first full-scale copper-iron container,
but the quality of its micro structure does not
meet the specifications to be required for an ac-
ceptable container. STUK will closely follow the
future research and development work related to
the disposal container and will report on any
progress to be achieved in the field. STUK’s defi-
nite judgement of the compliance with the quality
specifications will be needed, at the latest, in the
construction licence phase. Appendix 15 includes a
detailed review of the present status of disposal
container manufacturing technology.
The designs for the aboveground and under-
ground parts of the disposal facility are presented
in the DiP application and in Posiva’s reports
(Kukkola 1999b, Riekkola et al 1999). The con-
struction engineering design is based on existing
and proven technology. Compliance of the design
of the underground facility with the respective
safety requirements is discussed in Chapter 3.3.
Transfer of the waste canister into the deposition
hole with bentonite lining and backfilling of the
emplacement tunnels will be tested in near future
by full-scale experiments in the Swedish Äspö
rock laboratory.
Posiva has a quality management system in-
tended for ensuring the coherence in company’s
activities. It contains guidelines on three levels:
the actual quality handbook (Posiva Oy 1999),
procedural guidelines and working guidelines.
The quality handbook describes Posiva’s organ-
isation and the duties of its units and employees.
The description of activities covers the strategic
plan, branches of activity and contractual proce-
dures between Posiva and its customers or sub-
contractors. The procedural guidelines give de-
tailed guidance for the research, development and
planning work. The working guidelines define the
modes of operation and responsibilities in Posiva's
own research and development work.
Posiva’s quality management system is con-
sistent with principles included in the interna-
tional ISO 9001 quality management system. The
descriptions included in the quality management
system are appropriate and sufficient in detail
and clarity. STUK deems that Posiva’s activities
have been conducted in compliance with the quali-
ty management system. STUK intends to audit
Posiva’s quality management system during 2000.
A high safety culture means that sufficient
emphasis is given on safety in all organisations
whose activities are involved with safety issues.
Safety culture consists of organisations' modes of
operation and individuals' attitudes.
STUK has observed Posiva's prevailing safety
culture and its evolution on the basis of findings
obtained in connection with the regulatory sur-
veillance activities. Significant deficiencies have
not been identified and STUK concludes that
Posiva's safety culture complies with the safety
requirements. As the disposal project proceeds,
safety culture will be of growing importance to
Posiva and its subcontractors and consequently,
development of a more formal safety culture than
thus far and its integration to the quality manage-
ment system becomes necessary.
In the DiP application, Posiva has also present-
ed views on the continuous safety improvement,
safety classification of vital components and sys-
tems and on ensurance of safety functions. STUK
has no objections to these preliminary plans but,
even in this area, a more definite judgement of
compliance with the safety requirements will be
made in the construction licence phase.
On the basis of what has been said above,
STUK deems that the reported preliminary plans
for the disposal facility adequately fulfil the gen-
eral design principles included in the Govenment
Decision.
3.2 Prevention of releases and
accidents
Safety requirements
Sections 17–22 of the Government Decision in-
clude the following requirements:
The dispersion of radioactive substances inside
14
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the disposal facility as a consequence of handling
of spent fuel shall be limited to the minimum. The
released solid, liquid and particulate airborne
radioactive matter shall be collected and treated
as radioactive waste.
Compliance with operational radiation protec-
tion constraints shall be ensured by means of
continuous or regular monitoring, focused on the
potential discharge routes at the disposal facility
and on the activity concentrations in the surround-
ings of the disposal facility.
The formation of such spent fuel configurations
that would cause an uncontrolled chain reaction of
fission shall be prevented by means of structural
design of systems and components.
The disposal facility shall be designed so that
the likelihood of a fire is low and its consequences
are of minor importance to safety.
The disposal facility shall be designed so that
explosions that would jeopardise the integrity of
spent fuel bundles, waste canisters, or the compo-
nents or chambers containing radioactive sub-
stances, are reliably prevented.
The disposal facility shall be designed so that
the impacts caused by potential natural phenome-
na and other external events are taken into ac-
count.
The Decision of the Council of State on the
general regulations for physical protection of nu-
clear power plants (396/1991) shall apply, in ac-
cordance with its Section 12, to the disposal facili-
ty to the extent required by the degree of threat
posed by unlawful activities to the nuclear facility
concerned.
The Decision of the Council of State on the
general regulations for emergency response ar-
rangements at nuclear power plants (397/1991)
shall apply, in accordance with its Section 10, to
the disposal facility to the extent required by the
degree of danger posed by the nuclear facility
concerned.
Compliance with the safety requirements
The spent fuel to be handled in the disposal facili-
ty has cooled down for at least 20 years. Due to
the long cooling time, the activity in spent fuel has
decreased significantly and it contains only few
nuclides which could be easily released in case of
transient or accident. Because the residual heat of
spent fuel to be handled is not particularly high
and no high pressures or temperatures are needed
in the handling chambers, it is very unlikely that
major quantities of radioactive substances would
be released inside the facility or into its environ-
ment.
If the disposal facility will be built at Olkiluoto,
the encapsulation facility may be located next to
the existing spent fuel storage building. Then the
transfer of fuel bundles to the encapsulation facili-
ty would become simpler and it would be possible
to limit further temperature transients in fuel and
thereby also potential for radioactive releases.
The typical operational transients and acci-
dents in the encapsulation facility and in the
underground facility include malfunctions related
to handling of a transport container, fuel bundle
or waste canister, such as drop of a transport
container of damage of a fuel bundle during han-
dling in the hot cell. According to Posiva's prelimi-
nary designs and safety reports (Kukkola 1999a,
Kukkola 1999b), limitation of consequences of
accidents is based, for instance, on handling or
storing of spent fuel bundles either in hermetic
containers or in chambers with radiation protec-
tion arrangements. These arrangements include
filtering of off-gases and sewage waters to the
extent possible in order to prevent releases to the
environment. The radioactive substances arising
from the filtering systems and from decontamina-
tion of the handling chambers are recovered and
treated as radioactive waste. The potential dis-
charge routes of radioactive substances will be
equipped with activity monitoring systems.
Posiva's reports (Rossi et al 1999, Kukkola
1999a) examine various transients and accidents
and resulting radioactive releases and radiation
exposures. On the basis of these analyses it can be
concluded that the requirements for radiation
protection and limitation of releases in the Gov-
ernment Decision can be met by employing the
proposed, currently available technology.
The waste canister and the transport container
are the most significant spent fuel concentrations
in the disposal facility. The safety requirements
call for prevention of criticality accidents by
means of structural design of these components.
For the waste canister, this has been shown in
Posiva's report (Anttila M. 1999) and in a recent
Swedish safety assessment as well (SKB 1999).
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The criticality safety of the proposed spent fuel
containers has convincingly been demonstrated by
means of analyses and practical experience.
According to the DiP application, fire loads in
the chambers of the disposal facility, where radio-
active materials are handled, can be kept low. The
causes of and consequences from fires will be
limited by structural means, e.g. by fire cell, fire
detection and alarm, fire extinguishing and smoke
venting systems.
Explosives are handled in the underground
facility. According to the DiP application, explo-
sives are handled, stored, transported and used so
that the likelihood of an accidental explosion is
low and it would not be detrimental to radiation
safety.
Design of the disposal facility takes into ac-
count the effects caused by potential natural phe-
nomena and external events as described in
STUK's Guide YVL 1.0 concerning safety criteria
for the design of nuclear power plants. These
events and phenomena include earthquakes,
flooding and crashing aeroplane.
The DiP application explains that the arrange-
ments for physical protection and emergency pre-
paredness will be implemented in accordance with
the pertinent Government Decision concerning
the safety of nuclear power plants, taking into
account that the consequences of potential acci-
dents related to the operation of a disposal facility
are less than those related to nuclear power
plants.
As a summary of discussion above, STUK
deems feasible to design and construct the dispos-
al facility so that its operational safety is mainly
based on inherently safe systems and in compli-
ance with the pertinent safety requirements in-
cluded in the Government Decision.
3.3 Design of the underground
facility
Safety requirements
Sections 24–26 of the Government Decision
(478/1999) include the following requirements:
At the planned disposal depth, blocks of bed-
rock with adequate size and intactness shall exist
for the construction of the emplacement rooms. For
the design of the emplacement rooms and for the
acquisition of data needed for the safety analysis,
the host rock shall be adequately characterised by
means of investigations performed at the planned
disposal depth.
The design, excavation, other construction and
closure of the underground facility shall be imple-
mented in the best manner with regard to retain-
ing the characteristics of the host rock that are
important to long-term safety.
Excavation works related to enlargement of the
underground facility shall not be performed in the
vicinity of disposed waste canisters and even other-
wise the operations in the underground facility
shall be designed with regard to efficiently prevent
damages to waste canisters. Regarding under-
ground excavation and construction works, trans-
fers of rock masses or other comparable extensive
transfers shall not be performed in the same areas
which might simultaneously be used as transport
routes for waste packages.
Compliance with the safety requirements
The repository has tentatively been envisaged to
be located in the mica gneiss bedrock of the
Olkiluoto site at the depth of about 500 m (Anttila
P. et al 1999). The disposal tunnel network would
be placed on one level and would accommodate an
area of about 1 km2, if the amount of fuel to be
disposed of is 4000 tU. In case that the fuel
amount is substantially higher, extension of the
waste emplacement areas outside the focus area
for site investigations would be necessary.
The view of the suitability of Olkiluoto's bed-
rock for disposal is based on the site investiga-
tions performed there during the past ten years.
The proposed layout naturally sill stands for an
outline of the repository and a more accurate
location for the disposal tunnels cannot be deter-
mined until the completion of the investigations in
the underground research facility, which would be
constructed in the next phase of the site investiga-
tion program. The positions of the disposal tun-
nels are planned to be determined so that respect
distances of at least 50 m are left to the major
fracture zones included in the bedrock model.
Posiva is developing a system for the classification
of various weakness zones in bedrock.
A study on the constructability of the reposi-
tory at the Olkiluoto site has been reported by
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Posiva (Äikäs et al 1999). At Olkiluoto, the struc-
tural orientation and rock strength with respect to
its stress state affect the design of the repository
and may put limitations on the available disposal
depth as well as on the shape and orientation of
disposal tunnels (Apps. 12 and 13).
In the DiP application, vertical deposition holes
bored at the bottom of a disposal tunnel are
regarded as the primary method for emplacing
waste canisters, but along with it, horizontal em-
placement of waste canisters into tunnels is con-
sidered. The excavation of the disposal tunnels is
planned to be made so that intersection of major
fracture zones will be limited to the minimum
practicable. Excavation is intended to be based on
careful boring-blasting technique, a technique
wherefrom extended experiences exist in Finland.
Besides that, excavation by full-face boring tech-
nique will be considered, particularly in case that
horizontal emplacement of waste canisters in tun-
nels will be adopted e.g. in order to limit the
effects of rock stresses.
Disposal operations are planned to be per-
formed so that after the excavation of a disposal
tunnel, there will be no unnecessary delay be-
tween the emplacement of waste canisters and
backfilling of the tunnel. This aims at limiting the
need for rock injections and reinforcements in the
tunnel and at prevention of transport of adverse
substances, such as organic or oxidising agents,
into the disposal tunnels. STUK's international
review team points out that use of concrete and
other potentially harmful materials should be
limited when constructing the repository (App. 5).
Construction of disposal tunnels and emplace-
ment of waste canisters into deposition holes is
planned to take place congruently, but these activ-
ities would be separated by protective walls and
respect distances would be adopted to dampen
excavation vibrations. Materials to the construc-
tion and waste emplacement areas would be trans-
ported via different routes.
STUK deems that the preliminary design of
the underground disposal facility and the plans
for disposal operations take adequately into ac-
count the pertinent safety requirements included
the Government Decision.
3.4 Implementation of control of
nuclear materials
Safety requirements
Section 23 of the Government Decision (478/1999)
includes the following requirements:
The design, construction, operation and closure
of a disposal facility shall be implemented so that
control of nuclear materials can be arranged in
accordance with pertinent regulations.
Control of nuclear materials aims at verifying
that nuclear materials are not transferred to nu-
clear weapons or other nuclear explosives and
that nuclear materials are used in accordance
with the licence conditions. Because disposal of
spent fuel is a novel issue with respect to nuclear
materials' control, the requirements for interna-
tional control of underground facilities and relat-
ed activities are still partly under development.
The international treaties will not allow termina-
tion of nuclear materials' control even after the
closure of the repository.
Control of nuclear materials call for verifica-
tion of data on nuclear materials by measure-
ments prior to disposal. The continuity of knowl-
edge of the verified data shall be ensured until the
closure of the repository.
The detailed implementation of nuclear mate-
rials' control will be defined in accordance with
the existing national regulations and internation-
al agreements. These regulations have not yet
established. International requirements for nucle-
ar materials' control have been discussed and
developed in particular within a multilateral in-
ternational project (the so called SAGOR-project)
under the leadership of the IAEA. IAEA has also
established an expert group for the development
and follow-up of nuclear materials' control related
to final disposal. In the following, some require-
ments are tentatively given for the control of
nuclear materials in spent nuclear fuel being
disposed of.
Accountancy of nuclear materials, based on the
respective accountancy at nuclear power plants,
shall be continued for nuclear materials being
handled or disposed of. All records shall be care-
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fully deposited and secured.
In the encapsulation facility, the reported data
on nuclear materials shall be verified with high
accuracy, because it is the final place where indi-
vidual fuel bundles are handled separately. Conse-
quently, non-destructive measurements of nuclear
material content must be feasible in the encapsu-
lation facility to ensure that the reported data are
correct and complete.
The transfer routes, handling processes and
auditing of nuclear materials shall be planned so
that continuity of knowledge can be ensured at
each stage. If the continuity of knowledge is lost
for a batch containing nuclear materials, the con-
trol measures shall be repeated for that batch.
Closure on any waste emplacement room is not
permitted until ensuring the continuity of knowl-
edge for nuclear materials content in the waste
canisters in that emplacement room.
Arrangements for nuclear materials' control
and provisions for the positioning and use of the
control instruments shall be considered in the
design and construction of a disposal facility. The
control program for a disposal facility and for the
disposal operations shall include provisions for
the verification of the design information and for
the careful follow-up of the construction of the
facility.
Compliance with the safety requirements
According to the DiP application, safeguards con-
trol would be based on accountancy of nuclear ma-
terials as well as on visual and technical measure-
ment, surveillance and registration methods in
the various stages of the disposal process. The
technical principles for the control would include:
• Control of compliance with the planned and
actual implementation of the facility (Design
Information Verification);
• Accountancy of nuclear materials during the
whole fuel cycle (Accountancy);
• Non-destructive assays for the verification of
the quantity and quality of fuel (Non-destruc-
tive Assay, NDA);
• Continuous physical containment and surveil-
lance of nuclear fuel to prevent losses and
entanglements (Containment and Surveillance,
C/S).
Control of nuclear materials is simplified because
the fuel bundles are not disassembled at the en-
capsulation facility but are emplaced into waste
canisters as such. However, a small number of
capsules containing parts of previously disassem-
bled bundles is likely to be encapsulated. Removal
of the lid of a sealed canister and retrieval of fuel
bundles will be required only if the canister is
defective.
In the control of the implementation of final
disposal, consideration shall be given to the modi-
fications of design information due to the progress
in host rock investigations and in underground
construction works. Since a disposal tunnel will be
backfilled as soon as possible after the emplace-
ment of all waste canisters there, direct surveil-
lance of waste canisters is not feasible thereafter
and the control must be based on indirect meth-
ods.
STUK will actively participate in the develop-
ment of international nuclear materials' control
system. In STUK's view, control of nuclear materi-
als can be implemented in accordance with the
pertinent international treaties and national reg-
ulations as well as the principles and require-
ments given above.
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Safety requirements
Section 8 of the Government Decision (478/1999)
includes the following requirements:
The long-term safety of disposal shall be based
on redundant barriers so that deficiency in one of
the barriers or a predictable geological change
does not jeopardise the long-term safety. The barri-
ers shall effectively hinder the release of disposed
radioactive substances into the host rock for sever-
al thousands of years.
The system of barriers include both engineered
and natural ones. Engineered barriers may con-
sist of:
• Uranium matrix of low solubility, where most
of the radioactive substances are incorporated;
• Hermetic, corrosion resistant and mechanical-
ly strong container, where the fuel bundles are
enclosed;
• The chemical environment of waste canisters,
which limits the dissolution and migration of
radioactive substances;
• The backfilling material around waste canis-
ters (the buffer), which has low hydraulic con-
ductivity and which yields minor rock move-
ments;
• The backfilling materials and sealing struc-
tures, which limit groundwater flow and trans-
port of radioactive substances through excavat-
ed rooms.
Natural barriers may consist of:
• The intact rock around the disposal tunnels,
which limits groundwater flow around waste
canisters;
• The host rock where low groundwater flow,
reducing and even otherwise favourable
groundwater chemistry and retardation of dis-
solved substances in rock limit the mobility of
radionuclides;
• The containment provided by the host rock
against natural phenomena and human ac-
tions.
In the determination of the long-term perform-
ance of the system of barriers, consideration shall
be given to sporadic deviations, as a consequence
of which the performance targets are necessarily
not met. Such deviations may be due to e.g. fail-
ures in the manufacturing or installation of engi-
neered barriers, random variations in the charac-
teristics of the natural barriers or their erroneous
determination. The performance targets for the
system of barriers as a whole shall be set so that
the safety requirements are met notwithstanding
the deviations discussed above.
The determination of the performance targets
for the barriers shall be based on an assumption
that the performance of a single barrier as a whole
may be significantly lower than the respective
target value due to some unpredicted phenome-
non. The safety requirements shall be met even in
such case.
The determination of the performance of barri-
ers shall take account of changes and events that
may occur in various assessment periods. The
characteristics of the host rock can be assumed to
remain in their present state up to an assessment
period of several thousands of years. However, the
effects of predictable processes, such as land uplift
and disturbances due to the excavations and the
disposed waste, shall be taken into account. The
performance targets for the engineered barriers
shall be set so that there will be no releases of
radioactive substances into the host rock during
the assessment period given above.
4 PERFORMANCE OF BARRIERS
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Compliance with the multiple barrier
requirement
The performance of the barriers is significantly
radionuclide dependent. Consequently, it is pru-
dent to consider separately four groups of nu-
clides:
• Short-lived fission products, particularly
strontium-90 and caesium-137;
• High mobility nuclides, particularly carbon-14,
clorine36, selenium-79, palladium-107, tin-
126, iodine-129 and caesium-135;
• Low mobility nuclides, particularly actinides
and fission product technetium-99;
• Nuclides in the structural parts of fuel bun-
dles.
Short-lived fission products
Strontium-90 and caesium-137 with half-lives of
about 30 years dominate the activity of also the
radiotoxicity of spent fuel for a few hundreds of
years. If the engineered barriers provide an effi-
cient containment for the waste for several thou-
sands of years, as called for in the safety require-
ments, the short-lived fission products will com-
pletely decay during that time.
If, however, the containment provided by the
waste canisters is not perfect even during the
initial centuries, the fraction of activity in fuel’s
gas gap and grain boundaries will be crucial.
Those radionuclides can be assumed to be re-
leased as soon as groundwater intrudes into the
waste canister. This instant release fraction is
estimated as 1% for strontiun-90 and 6% for
caesium-137 in the TILA-99 safety assessment
(Vieno and Nordman, 1999).
The solubility of caesium and strontium may
be high but, on the other hand, their migration
from fuel to rock through the so called near field is
very slow and, according to the TILA-99 analysis,
their activity will decay to a fraction of less than
one millionth during migration. Furthermore, the
transit time through geosphere is estimated to
lower the activity of these nuclides almost to a
similar fraction.
The considerations given above lead to a con-
clusion that three efficient barriers exist for the
containment of short-lived fission products: waste
canister, bentonite buffer and host rock. Substan-
tial deficiencies in the performance of a single
barrier seems not to jeopardise the compliance
with the safety requirements, although uncertain-
ties may affect significantly the release rates of
strontium-90 and caesium-137.
High mobility nuclides
In TILA-99 analysis, the estimates for the
instant release fractions of the high mobility nu-
clides vary between 1–12%. Because a typical
annual release fraction from fuel matrix is esti-
mated to remain between 10–6…10–5, the instant
release fraction will be crucial.
The relative activity of the high mobility nu-
clides with respect to the total activity of spent
fuel is very low: for instance, after 1000 years it is
about 5·10–5 and after 100 000 years about 10–3.
The total instant release activity is initially about
20 TBq, if the amount of spent fuel to be disposed
of were 4000 tU.
High mobility nuclides have high solubility in
groundwater and they are poorly retarded in ben-
tonite and rock. Having a very long half-life, most
of them will not decay significantly while migrat-
ing through the barriers. On the other hand, the
peak release rate values (expressed e.g. in Bq/a)
will substantially decrease due to dispersion phe-
nomena. Likewise, the temporal dispersion in the
loss of integrity of the waste canisters will provide
a respective dilution for the instant activity re-
leases of the high mobility nuclides.
The containment capability provided by the
barriers is limited for the high mobility nuclides
but, on the other hand, this implies that the
activity releases arising from these nuclides would
not crucially increase even if the performance of
the barriers were much worse than assumed.
Low mobility nuclides
Low mobility nuclides dominate the activity and
the radiotoxicity of spent fuel after a time period
of a few hundred years. They have generally insig-
nificant instant release fractions (nuclides in gas
gap and at grain boundaries). Given the reducing
conditions in the host rock, several barriers seem
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to exist for the containment of the low mobility
nuclides: the long-lived container, incorporation
into fuel of low dissolution rate, nuclide specific
solubility limitations and slow migration through
bentonite buffer and geosphere.
Because of the multiple containment for the
low mobility nuclides, the activity releases and
radiation exposure arising from these nuclides
will, according to the TILA-99 analysis, be very
low in comparison with those arising from the
high mobility nuclides. This conclusion is valid
even if the performance of a single barrier were
substantially impaired. Only if there will be defi-
ciencies in more than one barriers, like in case
where a major fault intersects the repository, the
radiation impact from the low mobility nuclides
might become dominating.
Nuclides in the structural parts of fuel bundles
The metallic structural parts of fuel bundles con-
tain both high and low mobility nuclides. The total
activity of the high mobility nuclides is of the same
order of magnitude as the respective activity in
the fuel whereas the total activity of the low mo-
bility nuclides is much less than that in the fuel.
These nuclides are incorporated in a metal matrix
wherefrom their release is estimated to take
103…104 years. A comparison with the nuclides in
the fuel suggests that the nuclides in the structur-
al parts of fuel bundles will generally have only a
marginal effect on radiation impacts.
Conclusions
The proposed disposal concept seems to provide
an efficient containment by the multiple barriers,
if weight is given on the radioactive substances
with the highest proportional activity in each as-
sessment period. On the other hand, spent fuel
contains also nuclides which will be released and
migrated rapidly after the loss of integrity of
waste canisters, but at any time their highest pro-
portion of the overall activity will be about one
thousandth.
Compliance with the requirement on engineered
barriers
The most important engineered components of Po-
siva’s disposal concept are the waste canister (cop-
per-iron container enclosing fuel bundles) and the
bentonite buffer around the waste canister. In ad-
dition, the hydrological and chemical conditions
provided by these materials and the surrounding
host rock are essential for the performance of the
engineered barriers.
Copper, uranium dioxide fuel and bentonite
are, on the basis of experimental evidence and
thermodynamic analyses, very stable materials in
the conditions that can be predicted to prevail in
the repository.
The disposal concept proposed by Posiva aims
at complete containment for very long times by
means of the copper-iron container. The design
basis for the waste canister is set so that corrosion
of the copper container would take even millions
of years in the repository environment. The design
of the container takes into account, as far as
possible, the geological changes due to e.g. future
glaciations.
The required performance of the waste canis-
ter calls for fulfilment of high quality require-
ments concerning e.g. microstructure, faultless-
ness of weld seams and tolerances. Compliance
with these requirements has not yet adequately
proven because of the limited experiences on the
manufacturing of massive copper containers. Both
Posiva and the Swedish SKB have recently fabri-
cated prototypes of full-scale waste canisters but
their material properties have not yet reached the
quality requirements to be called for a waste
canister. During the past few years, there has
been significant progress in the manufacturing
technology of copper containers as well as in the
electron beam welding technology of their seams
and in related inspection technology. A more de-
tailed review of waste canister fabrication technol-
ogy is included in a report by the Technical Re-
search Centre/Manufacturing Technology (App.
15).
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Demonstration of the long-term integrity of the
waste canister calls for exclusion of phenomena
that might result in an early loss of integrity of
the canister, such as creeping, local corrosion and
stress corrosion. The importance of these phenom-
ena are discussed in a review report by the Tech-
nical Research Centre/Manufacturing Technology
(App. 16). It results in a general conclusion that
further research is needed to judge the signifi-
cance of these phenomena, which could jeopardise
the integrity of waste canisters.
An essential feature with regard to the long-
term integrity of waste canister is that the ben-
tonite buffer retains the specified performance
capability. Consequently, it has to fulfil stringent
quality requirements with regard to e.g. material
properties and compaction density. Essential prop-
erties for the mechanical stability include the
ability of bentonite to yield rock movements and
its ability to bear the waste canister having signif-
icantly higher density. To ensure the chemical and
microstructural stability of bentonite, it is impor-
tant to limit in the repository the peak tempera-
tures and the quantities of materials containing
readily dissoluble potassium and carbonate (Apps.
5 and 9). Future research is needed to get con-
firmed of these issues.
STUK deems that the engineered barriers in-
cluded in Posiva’s disposal concept have good
potential for providing almost complete contain-
ment for radionuclides from the host rock for
several thousands of years, as specified in the
safety requirements. Getting confirmed of this
calls for continuation of the research work and
full-scale performance tests. Such activities are
included in the planned research and develop-
ment period subsequent to the DiP. Because the
complete faultlessness of waste container fabrica-
tion, encapsulation and emplacement operations
cannot be assumed, even the future safety assess-
ments should take into account that a small frac-
tion of waste canisters may loose their integrity
substantially earlier than the specified minimum
containment period.
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Safety requirements
Sections 9 and 10 of the Government Decision
(478/1999) include the following requirements:
The geological characteristics of the disposal
site shall, as a whole, be favourable for the isola-
tion of the disposed radioactive substances from
the environment. An area having a feature that is
substantially adverse to long-term safety shall not
be selected as the disposal site.
The repository shall be located at a sufficient
depth in order to mitigate the impacts of above-
ground events, actions and environmental changes
on the long-term safety and to render inadvertent
human intrusion to the repository very difficult.
The characteristics of the host rock should be
such that it adequately acts as a natural barrier,
as specified in Chapter 4. Besides that, the char-
acteristics of the host rock should be favourable
with respect to the long-term performance of engi-
neered barriers. Such conditions in the host rock
as are of importance to long-term safety, should
such be stable or predictable up to at least several
thousands of years and thereafter the range of
geological changes should be estimable.
Factors indicating suitability of a disposal site
include.
• Proximity of exploitable natural resources;
• Abnormally high rock stresses;
• Anomalous seismic or tectonic activity;
• Adverse groundwater characteristics, such as
lack of reducing buffering capacity and high
concentrations of substances which might sub-
stantially impair the performance of barriers;
• Structural configuration of the host rock which
is exceptionally difficult to interpret.
The disposal depth should be selected with due
regard to long-term safety, taking into account at
least:
• The geological structures and lithological prop-
erties of the host rock;
• The trends in rock stress, temperature and
groundwater flow rate with depth;
• The dampening of the effects of aboveground
natural phenomena, such as glaciation, and
human activities.
To ensure that the effects of aboveground activi-
ties and phenomena will remain low enough, the
repository should be located at the depth of sever-
al hundreds of meters.
Compliance with the safety requirements
The basis for the selection of disposal site was
formed by a country-wide site screening complet-
ed in 1985 (Salmi et al 1985). The adopted site
selection criteria for and the steps in the site se-
lection process are described in Appendix 7 of the
DiP application. Important factors in the selection
of the investigation sites were in particular, be-
sides the geological ones, local attitudes and land-
ownership, because of being crucial to carrying
out the siting process.
In the DiP application, the disposal facility is
proposed to be located at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki
municipality, one of the four sites where the site
investigations have been completed. Posiva con-
cludes that safe disposal would be feasible at all
four sites and that the differences between the
various sites are not very significant with respect
to safety of disposal. Consequently, Posiva has
5 SUITABILITY OF THE DISPOSAL SITE
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founded the site selection decision mainly on other
than geological factors.
The investigations made so far have revealed
no factors which would indicate obvious unsuita-
bility of any of the four sites, when judged on the
basis of criteria given above. All investigation
sites represent rock types which are quite com-
mon in Finland. The Olkiluoto site is reported to
possess no particularly exploitable natural re-
sources (Ilveskivi and Niini, 1985).
Lithological and structural characteristics
Interpretation of the bedrock structures has been
made for all investigation sites. These interpreta-
tions, however, involve major uncertainties, be-
cause the available data on the orientations of
fracture zones are not adequate (App. 3). The site
scale bedrock structure model of each investiga-
tion site includes about thirty fracture zones. The
bedrock structure models were adopted as a basis
for a tentative identification of blocks of bedrock
with sufficient intactness and other properties for
hosting a repository. In the future investigations,
the orientations and properties of structures in-
side these blocks will be studied.
The DiP application is based on an assumption
that the emplacement rooms will be constructed
at the depth of 400–700 meters. More than one
bedrock blocks on different vertical levels may be
needed to host the repository. At Olkiluoto, a
repository for a fuel amount of 4000 tU is tenta-
tively designed to be located in mica gneiss rock
on one level at the depth of about 500 m (Anttila P.
et al 1999).
A report on the geological characteristics and
the constructability of the Olkiluoto site indicates
that demanding rock reinforcement might be
needed at the depth of more than 600 m (Äikäs et
al 1999).
Hydrogeology
The data obtained at all investigation sites during
several years indicate stable groundwater condi-
tions and no major differences between the sites
have been discovered. On the basis of hydrogeo-
logical investigations and interpretations, hydro-
geological models have been prepared for the sites.
A common feature for all sites is decrease of hy-
draulically highly conductive structures with
depth. The hydraulic conductivity of intact rock
seems also to decrease with depth.
The hydrogeological modelling is based on the
bedrock structure models and on hydrogeological
measurements. In the models of Olkiluoto and
Hästholmen sites, the effect of land uplift has also
been taken into account. STUK’s international
review team considered the geological investiga-
tion program being of high level, but criticised the
reconciliation of the structural data with hydroge-
ological data being not as successful as it could be
(Apps. 5 and 13).
Statistically fairly representative set of meas-
urement data suggests that the hydraulic conduc-
tivity of intact rock at Olkiluoto would be slightly
lower than the average of all investigation sites.
Another favourable feature of the Olkiluoto site is
the low hydraulic gradient and furthermore, it is
predicted not to change significantly due to future
land uplift. These factors imply that the ground-
water flow rate at disposal depth of the Olkiluoto
site seems to remain somewhat lower than that at
the other investigation sites (Vieno and Nordman,
1999).
Groundwater chemistry
Posiva’s investigations on groundwater chemistry
are comprehensive and of high scientific quality,
as concluded also in the reports by STUK’s inter-
national review team (Apps. 5, 8 and 14). Identi-
fied deficiencies include lack of analyses on the
chemical buffering capacity of the host rock with
respect to geological changes (App. 9).
From the groundwater chemistry point of view,
a major difference between the investigation sites
is that the groundwater of the coastal sites
(Olkiluoto and Hästholmen) turns from brackish
to saline at the disposal depth whereas it is fresh
at the inland sites (Kivetty and Romuvaara). The
coastal sites have by far more complex groundwa-
ter chemistry than the inland sites. Furthermore,
the groundwater chemistry at the coastal sites is
in slow transition state due to land uplift, result-
ing in progressive decrease of salinity with time.
The studies made so far suggest that the ef-
fects of groundwater salinity on the safety of
disposal are not significant, provided that the
concentrations are not much higher than those of
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the Olkiluoto site at the disposal depth. The
mobility of some nuclides may increase even in
slightly saline groundwater. The performance of
compacted bentonite will not deteriorate substan-
tially until the salinity is a couple of times higher
than at Olkiluoto’s planned disposal depth. How-
ever, the salinity is growing rapidly with depth at
Olkiluoto and may imply limitations to the availa-
ble disposal depth.
Olkiluoto’s groundwater chemistry at the dis-
posal depth propose low groundwater turnover
and long transit times (Anttila P. et al 1999). The
apparent inconsistency with the results of ground-
water modelling can be explained by the fact that
groundwater chemistry gives a temporally and
spatially integrated picture, whereas groundwater
modelling is focussed on fast flow routes.
Rock movements
For the detection of slow rock movements, a net-
work of GPS stations exist consisting of 12 coun-
try-wide stations and a local network at each in-
vestigation site. These measurements are intend-
ed to find the zones where horizontal or vertical
rock movements are likely to appear due to land
uplift, earth quakes or continental drift. The
measurement stations have been in use only a few
years and the measurement records are not yet
sufficient for any definite conclusions.
Posiva has reported site specific studies, which
include analyses of secondary displacements in
the fracture network of the host rock, caused by
an earthquake occurring in the vicinity of a dis-
posal site (La Pointe and Cladouhos 1999). The
results propose that such earthquake induced
displacements might be a significant risk only in
the post-glacial conditions, where the intensities
and frequencies of earthquakes can be essentially
higher than currently.
Studies on seismic histories of the investiga-
tion sites have also been made. At 100 kilometre
radius around the Olkiluoto site, the earthquakes
have been fairly small and infrequent during the
observation history (Saari 1998).
The land uplift due to the latest glaciation is
estimated to be currently 6 mm/a at Olkiluoto and
2 mm/a at Hästholmen at most (Miettinen et al
1999, Anttila P. 1999). The measurements indicate
that the land uplift is continuously slowing down.
Conclusions
In STUK’s view, no crucial differences exist be-
tween the investigation sites from the safety point
of view. The investigations made thus far suggest
that Olkiluoto is a suitable disposal site. The rock
mechanical properties and the growth of ground-
water salinity with depth may put some limita-
tions on the available disposal depth. Similar con-
clusions were also taken by STUK’s international
review team (App. 5).
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6.1 Demonstration of the
operational safety of the
disposal facility
Safety requirements
Section 27 of the Government Decision (478/1999)
includes the following requirements:
If compliance with the requirements for the
operational safety of the disposal facility cannot be
directly ascertained, it shall be demonstrated by
experimental or computational methods or their
combination. The computational methods shall be
selected so that the detriment or risk likely to occur,
with high degree of certainty, remains below the
results of analyses. The applied computational
methods shall be reliable and well validated for
dealing with the events of interest.
Compliance with the safety requirements
Posiva has assessed the operational safety of the
encapsulation facility and the underground dis-
posal facility by a computational analysis. This
analysis is based on the predesigns of the facilities
and on experimental input data on the properties
of spent fuel and its behaviour during transfer
operations. (Anttila 1998, Rossi et al 1999,
Suolanen et al 1999, Kukkola 1999a).
The radionuclide content and external radia-
tion intensity of spent fuel was assessed at the
Technical Research Centre (Anttila 1992, Anttila
1995 and Anttila 1998) by means of verified com-
puted codes. The accuracy of the outcome of these
calculations is good.
On the basis of the predesigns of the facilities,
scenarios were drawn up for the analyses of the
radiation exposures arising from normal opera-
tion, anticipated transients and potential acci-
dents. In normal operation, the most likely source
of radioactive releases would be leaking fuel rods.
In transients and accidents, the releases would
arise from fuel failures.
Radiation exposures for the various scenarios
have been analysed (Rossi et al 1999). Occupation-
al doses were calculated on the basis of the high-
est design basis radiation exposures inside the
facilities. The exposure of individuals in the vicin-
ity of the disposal facility is assumed to arise from
radionuclides which penetrate the filters and are
transported to atmosphere via ventilation stack.
The variations due to weather conditions have
been analysed probabilistically by employing an
established computed code.
The analyses on the operational safety of the
facilities are fairly simple with regard to the
affecting physical phenomena. Nevertheless, the
analyses involve uncertainties because of the ap-
proximate estimates for some input data, such as
the number of leaking fuel rods, the activity
fractions released from fuel and the shielding
factors for exposed individuals. In the reported
analyses, the selection of these input data targets
to resulting doses which overestimate the really
occurring exposure.
In STUK’s view, the assessments of the opera-
tional safety of the disposal facility are, with
regard to tentativeness of the plans, fairly com-
prehensive and are mostly based on methods
which lead to overestimation of the really arising
exposure.
6.2 Demonstration of the
long-term safety
Safety requirements
Sections 28 and 29 of the Government Decision
(478/1999) include the following requirements:
Compliance with long-term radiation protec-
tion objectives as well as the suitability of the
disposal concept and site shall be justified by
6 SAFETY ASSESSMENTS
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means of a safety analysis that addresses both the
expected evolutions and unlikely disruptive events
impairing long-term safety. The safety analysis
shall consist of a numerical analysis based on
experimental studies and be complemented by
qualitative expert judgement whenever quantita-
tive analyses are not feasible or are too uncertain.
Compliance with the radiation protection con-
straint given in Section 5 shall be demonstrated by
assuming such a self-sustaining community in the
vicinity of the disposal site that receives the high-
est radiation exposure. In addition to the impacts
on man, potential impacts on species of fauna and
flora shall also be examined.
The data and models introduced in the safety
analysis shall be based on the best available exper-
imental data and expert judgement. The data and
models shall be selected on the basis of conditions
that may exist at the disposal site during the
assessment period and, taking account of the avail-
able investigation methods, they shall be site-
specific and mutually consistent. The computa-
tional methods shall be selected on the basis that
the results of safety analysis, with high degree of
certainty, overestimate the radiation exposure or
radioactive release likely to occur. The uncertain-
ties involved with safety analysis and their impor-
tance to safety shall be assessed separately.
An assessment of the long-term safety of dis-
posal of spent fuel should include at least:
• Description of the disposal system (waste can-
ister, backfilling materials and sealing struc-
tures, excavated rooms, host rock and ground-
water regime, disposal site) and definition of
barriers;
• Analysis of the potential future evolutions of
the disposal system (scenario analysis);
• Definition of the performance targets for the
barriers;
• Required conceptual and mathematical model-
ling and the determination of the input data
needed in these models;
• Analysis of the activity releases and resulting
doses from radionuclides which are released
from the waste, penetrate the barriers and
enter to the biosphere;
• Whenever practicable, estimation of the proba-
bilities of activity releases and radiation doses
arising from unlikely disruptive events impair-
ing long-term safety;
• Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses and com-
plementary discussions on the significance of
such phenomena and events which cannot be
assessed quantitatively;
• Comparison of the outcome of analyses with
the safety requirements;
• Documentation of the safety assessment.
Compliance with the safety requirements
In the DiP application, the demonstration of long-
term safety of disposal is based on the TILA-99
safety assessment (Vieno and Nordman, 1999),
which has been made by the Technical research
Centre for Posiva. This assessment is not focussed
on the Olkiluoto site alone but addresses all four
investigation sites. TILA-99 assessment includes,
in principle, all the elements which are required
above for a safety assessment. Below, the adequa-
cy and appropriateness of TILA-99 is discussed.
TILA-99 assessment includes no explicit sce-
nario analysis, a lack which was identified also by
STUK’s international review group (Apps. 5, 7, 10
and 11). The authors of the analysis, however,
have participated in international scenario analy-
sis projects and utilised the knowledge received
from these exercises in the definition of scenarios
for TILA-99. In the context of the review work, no
such features, events or processes of importance
to safety were identified, which would be com-
pletely omitted in the TILA-99 assessment.
By nature, TILA-99 is a deterministic analysis,
i.e. it employs point input data. The analysis is
intends to be conservative, which means such
selection of the conceptual models and input data
that the outcome of the analysis, with great cer-
tainty, overestimate the radiation impact likely to
occur. On the other hand, the uncertainty margins
are extensive and consequently, absolutely con-
servative approach could not be applied for each
model and data. Due to the variety of models and
input data, it is difficult to judge the overall
conservatism in the results of TILA-99.
 The reference list of TILA-99 indicates that
the assessment has aimed at utilisation of the
best available experimental data and expertise.
The researchers involved in the assessment have
fairly good contacts to the most important re-
search projects related to disposal of nuclear
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waste into crystalline bedrock. Posiva has agree-
ments on co-operation and exchange of informa-
tion with the foremost respective foreign organi-
sations. STUK’s international review group also
deemed that TILA-99 assessment and its back-
ground studies are in line with the best interna-
tional practice (App. 5).
The geological data in TILA-99 are, as far as
practicable, derived from the results of Posiva’s
site investigations. They are generally representa-
tive for the bedrock of all four investigation sites
but not specific to the proposed disposal site,
Olkiluoto. Some of the data are, however, specific
to saline groundwater (like at Olkiluoto and
Hästholmen) or to fresh groundwater (like at
Romuvaara and Kivetty). Furthermore, the effects
of land uplift occurring at Olkiluoto and Hästhol-
men has been analysed.
In addition to what has been said above, the
following deficiencies and simplifications in TILA-
99, as identified likewise by STUK’s review group
(Apps. 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11), can be listed:
• TILA-99 is a single canister analysis. Conse-
quently, the sensitivity in results arising from
e.g. the variations in properties of rock sur-
rounding the waste canisters cannot be easily
deemed;
• The parametric values in TILA-99 are invari-
ant in time, although the uncertainties in-
volved in e.g. geological parameters increase
with time. Consequently, the degree of conserv-
atism in the assessment is deemed to decrease
as the time period of interest grows;
• The scenario describing poor performance of
the bentonite buffer is not representative for
situations where the containment provided by
bentonite might crucially deteriorate;
• In TILA-99, the analysis of radiation doses is
simplified by applying only a well scenario,
while the significance of other exposure path-
ways are estimated on the basis of other safety
assessments. Besides that, the dilution factor
assumed in the well scenario is substantially
higher than that in some Swedish safety as-
sessments (SKI 1996, SKB 1999);
• The radiation impact on living populations in
the disposal site environment has been as-
sessed in a quite limited extent. On the other
hand, that subject still lacks experimental
knowledge even internationally.
To counterweight the simplifications and uncer-
tainties, TILA-99 includes a variety of sensitivity
scenarios for the assessment of the effects of pa-
rameter variations on the results.
In STUK’s view, TILA-99, along with certain
other comparable safety assessments published in
the past years (SKB 1992, Vieno et al 1992, SKI
1996, Vieno et al 1996, SKB 1999), can be adopted
as a basis for the judgement of the long-term
safety of the proposed disposal concept. During
the forthcoming research and development period,
the safety assessment methodology should be im-
proved so that the deficiencies discussed above
will be eliminated, and so that more site specific
input data than currently can be introduced in the
analysis.
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7.1 Operational safety of the
disposal facility
Safety requirements
Section 4 of the Government Decision (478/1999)
includes the following requirement:
The operation of a disposal facility shall not
cause radiation exposure that could endanger oc-
cupational or public safety or could otherwise
harm the environment or property.
The disposal facility and its operation shall be
designed so that:
(1) as a consequence of undisturbed operation
of the facility, discharges of radioactive substances
to the environment remain insignificantly low;
(2) the annual effective dose to the most exposed
members of the public as a consequence of antici-
pated operational transients remains below 0.1
mSv; and
(3) the annual effective dose to the most exposed
members of the public as a consequence of postu-
lated accidents remains below 1 mSv.
In the application of this Section, such radia-
tion doses that arise from natural radioactive
substances, released from the host rock or ground-
water bodies of the disposal facility shall not be
considered.
Compliance with the safety requirements
The planned disposal facility has good potential
for limiting the operational radiation exposure to
a low level, because:
• Only limited amounts of spent fuel with long
cooling time is handled there at a time;
• The handling operations are fairly simple;
• No high temperatures or pressures are needed
in the handling chambers.
The reference reports of the DiP application de-
scribe the normal operations and the possible
transients and accidents in the disposal facility
(Kukkola 1999a). They also include analyses on
the radiation doses from normal operation as well
as from transients and accidents to the most ex-
posed individuals in the vicinity of the facility
(Rossi et al 1999).
The assessment of the occupational radiation
exposure is based on pessimistic assumptions, i.e.
which target to overestimate the real doses. Ac-
cording to the analysis, most of the radiation
exposure would arise from the receipt of transport
containers. The annual collective occupational ex-
posure would remain to a small fraction of that
received at nuclear power plants, but in order to
limit individual doses, exchange of workers during
one year might be needed in the spent fuel recep-
tion activities. In STUK’s view, a preferable ap-
proach is to plan the receipt of transport container
so that significant reduction of radiation doses is
feasible.
The doses to the most exposed individuals, due
to releases from the normal operation, have been
analysed probabilistically with respect to weather
conditions. The results indicate that in the vicini-
ty of the facility, the annual dose commitment
would be about 0,01 mSv per year at most with
99,5 % confidence and 0,001 mSv per year at most
with 95 % confidence.
Anticipated transients mean incidents with es-
timated average occurrence of less than once a
year but having a significant probability to occur
at least once during the operational period of the
facility. The radiation doses to the most exposed
individuals from such incidents has been assessed,
with great certainty, to remain below one hun-
dredth of the respective dose constraint of 0,1 mSv
per year.
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Postulated accidents mean incidents which
have a low probability to occur during the opera-
tional period. According to the results of the anal-
yses, the highest radiation doses from such acci-
dents will, with high degree of certainty, be about
one tenth of the respective dose constraint of 1
mSv per year, and only by assuming extremely
unfavourable weather conditions these doses
would approach the constraint.
With reference to discussion above, STUK
deems that the operation of the disposal facility
can be implemented in compliance with the safety
requirements included in the Government Deci-
sion.
7.2 Safety of the transportation of
spent fuel
Safety requirements
A DiP for spent fuel disposal need not to cover
transportation of spent fuel from the NPPs to the
disposal facility and it is neither included in Posi-
va’s application. Because the safety of transporta-
tion is an issue which will probably emerge in the
discussions related to the DiP, STUK will make
below a brief review of the reports dealing with
the safety of transportation.
The safety requirements for the transportation
of spent fuel are included in the Act on Transpor-
tation of Dangerous Materials (719/1994) and the
regulations pursuant to it. In addition, STUK’s
Guide YVL 6.5 addresses transportation of nucle-
ar materials and nuclear waste.
The safety requirements for transportation are
based on the approach that the transport contain-
er, in the first place, ensures the safety. Interna-
tionally standardised container types exist for
transports of different kind of radioactive sub-
stances. For the transport of spent nuclear fuel, a
B type container is required, which must qualify
very demanding accident tests.
The transportation regulations set also con-
straints for the radiation dose rate outside the
container in order to protect the transport person-
nel and other people in the vicinity of the contain-
er. These constraints are 2 mSv per hour on the
surface of the container and 0,1 mSv per hour at
the distance of one meter from the container.
Furthermore, the regulations limit the outer sur-
face contamination of containers in order to pre-
vent spread of radioactive substances into the
environment during transportation.
Compliance with the safety requirements
The health risks from transportation of spent fuel
has been assessed in a report prepared by the
Technical Research Centre (Suolanen et al 1999).
The report considers transports from the NPP
sites Hästholmen and Olkiluoto to the other sites
being candidates for a disposal site.
The annual amount of spent fuel to be trans-
ported would be 110 tU on the average. The
number of shipments would depend on the trans-
port mode (road, rail or sea transport) and on the
number of containers in one shipment.
The assessment of radiation exposure from
normal situations is based on the maximum per-
missible dose rates during transports. The doses
even to the most exposed members of the public
will remain insignificant.
Assessed transients include a stopover of the
transport, facilitating people to get close to the
container, and releases of radioactive substances
left on the outer surfaces of containers. The doses
from these scenarios would remain low.
The report also includes analyses, which target
to find out the consequences from severe damages
to a transport package. Such accidents have not
occurred thus far although thousands of trans-
ports of high-level waste have been made during
more than 30 years. The results of these analyses
indicate that, in the worst cases, temporary pro-
tection action for the public at the location of the
accident might be needed.
Posiva's report makes also a comparison be-
tween the conventional traffic accident risks and
the radiological risks due to transports. In con-
formity with some earlier studies on the same
subject, the report concludes that conventional
accident risk exceeds the radiological one.
In Posiva's reports, the safety of sea transports
is discussed less comprehensively than the safety
of land transports. If Olkiluoto will be the disposal
site, spent fuel from the Loviisa NPP would proba-
bly be shipped to the disposal site by sea. In
Sweden, experiences from sea transport of spent
fuel over 15 years exist supported with compre-
hensive safety studies. Consequently, STUK
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deems that sea transport of spent fuel involves no
such safety issues as would currently require
further clarification.
Posiva's report and the international experi-
ences from spent fuel transports over 30 years
support the view that the transports of spent fuel
to the disposal facility can be carried out in
compliance with the international and national
safety requirements.
7.3 Long-term safety
Sections 5 and 6 of the Government Decision (478/
1999) include the following requirements:
In any assessment period, disposal shall not
cause health or environmental effects that would
exceed the maximum level considered acceptable
during the implementation of disposal.
Disposal shall be so designed that as a conse-
quence of expected evolutions, the radiation im-
pacts remain below the constraints given in para-
graphs 3 and 4.
In an assessment period that is adequately
predictable with respect to assessments of human
exposure but that shall be extended to at least
several thousands of years:
(1) the annual effective dose to the most exposed
members of the public shall remain below 0.1 mSv;
and
(2) the average annual effective doses to other
members of the public shall remain insignificantly
low.
Beyond the assessment period referred to above,
the average quantities of radioactive substances
over long time periods, released from the disposed
waste and migrated to the environment, shall
remain below the nuclide specific constraints de-
fined by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Author-
ity. These constraints shall be defined so that:
(1) at their maximum, the radiation impacts
arising from disposal can be comparable to those
arising from natural radioactive substances; and
(2) on a large scale, the radiation impacts
remain insignificantly low.
The importance to long-term safety of unlikely
disruptive events impairing long-term safety shall
be assessed and, whenever practicable, the accept-
ability of the consequences and expectancies of
radiation impacts caused by such events shall be
evaluated in relation to the dose and release rate
constraints specified in Section 5 above.
The long-term radiation protection objectives giv-
en above shall be followed in the design and im-
plementation of a disposal facility. In accordance
with the optimisation principle included in Sec-
tion 2 of the Radiation Act and the continuous
safety improvement principle included in Section
12 of the Government Decision, all practicable
means shall be adopted for further reduction of
radiation exposure, although the constraints were
met.
The constraint for the most exposed individu-
als, effective dose of 0,1 mSv per year, will apply
to a self-sustaining family or small-village com-
munity living in the vicinity of the disposal site,
where the highest radiation exposure occurs. In
the environs of the community, a small lake and a
near surface well is assumed to exist. The expo-
sure pathways to be considered include, as a
minimum, the use of contaminated waters as
household and irrigation water and the food
chains in contaminated watercourses.
In addition, the safety assessment shall ad-
dress the average effective annual doses to larger
groups of people, who are living at a regional lake
or a coastal site and are exposed to the radioactive
substances transported into these watercourses.
These average doses shall be, depending of the
number of exposed people, not more than one
hundredth – one tenth of the constraint for the
most exposed individuals.
The nuclide specific constraints for the release
rates of disposed radioactive substances to the
environment, referred to in Section 5 of the Gov-
ernment Decision, will be specified in STUK’s
YVL Guide. In the review of TVO-92 safety as-
sessment, reported by STUK in 1994, the follow-
ing nuclide group specific constraints were adopt-
ed:
• 0,1 GBq/a for radium-226, thorium-229, pro-
tactinium-231, uranium-238, plutonium-239
and -240, neptunium-237 and americium-243;
• 1 GBq/a for chlorine-36, selenium-79, niobium-
94, tin-126, iodine-129 and caesium-135;
• 10 GBq/a for carbon-14, nickel-59, zirconium-
93, technetium-99 and palldium-107.
S T U K - B - Y T O 1 9 8
31
The constraints need to be reconsidered in the
light of the latest biosphere analyses (e.g. SKB
1999), which may imply changes in the constraints
but probably not more than by a factor of ten. The
activity releases can be averaged over 1000 years
at most.
Typical unlikely disruptive events impairing
long-term safety, referred to in Section 6 of the
Government Decision, include:
• Boring a deep well at the disposal site;
• Core-drilling hitting a waste canister;
• Rock movement damaging a number of waste
canisters.
The importance to safety of any such incidental
and unintentional event should be assessed and
whenever practicable, the resulting annual radia-
tion dose or activity release should be calculated
and multiplied by the probability of its occurence.
This expectation value should be below the radia-
tion dose or activity release constraints given
above. If, however, the resulting individual dose
might imply deterministic radiation impacts (dose
above 0,5 Sv), its annual probability of occurrence
should remain below 10–6.
Disposal of spent fuel shall not affect detrimen-
tally to species of fauna and flora. This shall be
demonstrated by assessing the typical radiation
exposures of land and aquatic populations in the
disposal site environment. These exposures shall
remain clearly below the levels, which on the
basis of the best available scientific knowledge
would cause decline in biodiversity or other signif-
icant detriment to any living population. Moreo-
ver, rare and economically significant animals and
plants as well as domestic animals shall not be
exposed detrimentally as individuals.
Compliance with the safety requirements
Radiation dose constraints
Because the technical barriers are required to pro-
vide an efficient containment for several thou-
sands of years, releases of radioactive substances
into biosphere in this time period could take place
only if, due to e.g. fabrication or installation de-
fects, a small number of waste canisters would
prematurely loose their integrity. This kind of sit-
uation is described by the “pinhole” scenario of
TILA-99 safety assessment.
If the other barriers performed as assumed,
the highest radiation doses would arise from the
high mobility nuclides, such as iodine-129, caesi-
um-135 and carbon-14. The maximum dosed dur-
ing the first 10 000 years would be less than 10–9
Sv per year for each failed waste canister.
The radiation doses from the “pinhole” scenario
are not sensitive to most of the uncertainties
related to the performance of barriers. Substan-
tially higher radiation doses would arise only from
extreme scenarios, for instance if an initially leak-
ing canister, high groundwater flow around the
waste canister and saline groundwater chemistry
occurred simultaneously.
However, TILA-99 analysis pays inadequate
attention to multiple failures with potential caus-
al relation. A scenario like this is, for instance, the
growth of an initial “pinhole” due to corrosion of
iron and the deterioration of bentonite’s contain-
ment capability because of the outburst of corro-
sion gases or swelling of corrosion products. If this
kind of scenario is assumed to take place during
the first thousands of years, the maximum radia-
tion doses would amount to 10–7…10–6 Sv per year
and failed canister according to the TILA-99 anal-
ysis. On the other hand, a recent Swedish safety
assessment (SKB 1999) concludes that in spite of
the “pinhole”, releases of radioactive substances
would not occur until after 200 000 years.
TILA-99 include no analyses on radiation dos-
es to larger groups of populations. Instead of that,
it refers to Swedish safety assessments (SKB
1992, SKI 1996), which compare the maximum
radiation doses from the well scenario with those
arising from the coastal scenario. The “coastal”
radiation doses, due to consumption of sea fish,
would be below the “well” doses at least by a factor
of 100 for the most critical nuclides (carbon-14,
caesium-135, tin-126 and selenium-79) and by a
factor 1000 for the other nuclides. Similar results
were also obtained in the safety assessment for
the disposal facility of low and intermediate level
waste at Olkiluoto (Vieno et al 1991).
Activity release constraints
The activity release constraints are applied within
the time period beyond several thousands of years,
when major climate changes and as a conse-
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quence, significant geological changes are likely.
Although the design basis lifetime of copper con-
tainer is millions of years, the uncertainties relat-
ed to its integrity will increase due to said geologi-
cal changes and, on the basis of the principle of
conservatism, it is reasonable to assume the loss
of integrity of container much earlier than the
design basis lifetime.
In order to judge the compliance with the
release rate constraints, an illustrative and appar-
ently conservative assumption is made that the
copper-iron containers start to loose their integri-
ty at 10 000 years and after 50 000 years the
barrier function of all containers has been lost The
resulting activity releases can be assumed on the
basis of the “disappearing canister” scenario of
TILA-99. The highest releases to the biosphere
and the percentages of the respective constraints
for the most critical nuclides would be as follows:
Carbon-14: 0,5 GBq/a,  5% of constraint
Cloride-36: 0,1 GBq/a, 10% of constraint
Tin-126: 0,3 GBq/a, 30% of constraint
Iodine-129: 0,01 GBq/a, 1% of constraint
Caesium-135: 0,04 GBq/a, 4% of constraint.
In the scenario assumed above, the difference be-
tween fresh and saline groundwater is not signifi-
cant. Even more generally, the release rates are
not particularly sensitive to the uncertainties in
the performance of a single barrier, because the
critical nuclides belong to the high mobility group.
Only in case that the performance of more than
one barriers would not meet the performance tar-
gets, the releases of the low mobility nuclides
might become dominating.
Disruptive events
TILA-99 contains no explicit analysis on radiation
doses arising from a deep well (e.g. 300 m) bored
in the vicinity of the repository, but these doses
can be approximated on the basis of the results of
the shallow well scenario included in TILA-99. In
a deep well, dilution would probably be much less
than in a shallow well but, on the other hand, the
likelihood of the existence of the deep well at the
moment of interest would be low. Consequently,
the expectation value of the deep well dose would
not be substantially higher than the shallow well
dose.
The consequences from a deep boring or core
drilling has neither been analysed in the TILA-99
report. Scenarios of this type have been analysed
in earlier Finnish and Swedish safety assess-
ments (Vieno et al 1985, SKB 1999). The results
indicate typically that the resulting radiation dos-
es, e.g. to workers handling the drill core, can be
high. On the other hand, the probability of hitting
a waste canister by drilling, estimated on the
basis of the current frequency of deep drillings,
remains to the magnitude range of 10–7 per year.
Thus, the expectation value of the radiation im-
pact would be by far below the constraint.
TILA-99 includes an outline of a scenario,
where a major rock displacement breaks a number
of waste canisters. That scenario also assumes the
loss of containment by bentonite and of unfavour-
able parameter values for groundwater flow and
chemistry. A rock displacement is likely to occur in
post-glacial conditions and consequently TILA-99
assumes it to happen at 30 000 years from now on.
Recent studies on climate changes and ice ages,
however suggest the glaciation to approach con-
siderably later than TILA-99 assumes (Forrström,
1999, SKB 1999).
The resulting dose from the rock displacement
scenario is 0,03 mSv per year for each broken
waste canister and the dominant nuclide is pluto-
niun-239. Given that in each displacement up to
some tens of waste canisters might be broken, the
maximum dose would be about 2 mSv per year. If
the post-glacial conditions are assumed to prevail
not until after 50 000 years, the dose would be
about half of the value given above.
Quantitative estimation of the likelihood of a
rock displacement intersecting the repository is
highly uncertain on the basis of the present knowl-
edge, although studies on the post-glacial dis-
placement in Fennosscaninadian have been made
during the past years (Kuivamäki et al 1998). If
the repository is located appropriately, the likeli-
hood of a such displacement can be deemed to be
small even in the forthcoming post-glacial condi-
tions. Consequently, the expectation value of radi-
ation dose can be estimated to remain well below
the constraint of 0.1 mSv per year.
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Protection of other living nature
The international principles and radiation expo-
sure criteria for the protection of the other living
nature are still under development (IAEA
1999).The current view is that living species shall
be protected as populations, with the exception of
rare or economically significant species and do-
mestic animals. The best currently available sci-
entific knowledge suggests that a radiation dose of
0,1 mGy per hour (about 800 mGy per year) to a
fraction of individuals in a healthy population will
not affect detrimentally this population (UN-
SCEAR 1996). Said radiation dose is over thou-
sand times more than the constraint for the most
exposed people due to disposal and more than
hundredfold in comparison with the natural back-
ground radiation. It is consequently evident that
the established radiation protection requirements
ensure adequate protection of living populations
and preservation of biodiversity.
Presumably protection of man will ensure ade-
quate protection of rare and economically valuable
species and domestic animals as well. The poten-
tial impacts of waste disposal will also be limited
because the radiation exposure is concentrated in
a fairly small area.
TILA-99 analysis refers to certain Canadian
and Swedish studies, where the radiation expo-
sure of plants, mammals, birds and fishes is
assessed. All these estimates remain significantly
below the potentially detrimental exposure levels.
The ethical principles and criteria for the pro-
tection of plants and animals and related methods
for dose assessment will be extensively studied
within various international organisations (ICRP,
IAEA, EU) during the coming few years. Protec-
tion of other living nature is adequately consid-
ered in the present safety case, in spite of the
limited discussion on the subject in the DiP appli-
cation and TILA-99 analysis.
Conclusions
On the basis of the safety reports referred to in
the DiP application, the appended review reports
and its own review work, STUK deems that the
proposed disposal concept and site comply with
the requirements for long-term safety. This con-
clusion calls for that the performance of the sys-
tem of barriers as a whole is not crucially lower
than that assumed in the safety assessment. In
particular, the performance of the engineered bar-
riers during the first thousands of years is impor-
tant to safety. To get confirmed of the safety, com-
prehensive studies are needed during the forth-
coming research and development period.
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The disposal concept proposed by Posiva is con-
sistent with the provisions of the nuclear energy
legislation on nuclear waste management. Posi-
va’s implementation program for disposal com-
plies with the target schedule decided by the Gov-
ernment in 1983 and confirmed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry last time in 1995. In STUK’s
view, the scheduling and way of implementation of
Posiva’s disposal plan includes flexibility to such
extent that the pertinent safety requirements can
be taken into account.
The disposal facility, including the above-
ground encapsulation facility and the under-
ground repository with auxiliary facilities, has
been preliminarily designed with focus on the
determination of the safety related design bases
for the facility. STUK deems these preliminary
plans appropriate and adequate in the present
phase.
Safety assessments have been prepared for the
operation of the disposal facility and the transpor-
tation of spent fuel to the facility. In STUK’s view,
these assessments demonstrate sufficiently com-
pliance with the safety requirements. Transporta-
tion, encapsulation and emplacement of spent fuel
will be based mainly on inherently safe systems
and involve no potential for a severe environmen-
tal accidents.
The long-term safety of disposal is planned to
be based on a system of multiple barriers. These
barriers are natural, like the bedrock, and engi-
neered structures, like the waste container. The
proposed disposal concept seems to provide an
efficient containment by the multiple barriers, if
weight is given on the radioactive substances with
the highest proportional activity in each assess-
ment period.
STUK deems that the engineered barriers in-
cluded in Posiva’s disposal concept have good
potential for providing almost complete contain-
ment for radionuclides from the host rock for
several thousands of years, as specified in the
safety requirements. Getting confirmed of this
calls for continuation of the research work and
full-scale performance tests. Such activities are
included in the planned research and develop-
ment period subsequent to DiP.
The detailed site investigations have been com-
pleted at four sites. STUK has evaluated their
suitability for disposal and judges that no crucial
differences exist between the investigation sites
from the safety point of view. The investigations
made thus far suggest that Olkiluoto is a suitable
disposal site. The rock mechanical properties and
the growth of groundwater salinity with depth at
Olkiluoto may limit the most suitable disposal
depth to less than 700 metres, which is the maxi-
mum depth specified in the DiP application.
The long-term safety of disposal is justified by
a safety assessment, which is supported by stud-
ies made during the past two decades. In STUK’s
view, that safety assessment, along with certain
other comparable assessments published in the
past years, can be adopted as a basis for the
judgement of the long-term safety of the disposal
concept proposed in the DiP application.
In the light of the safety reports referred to in
the DiP application and of the review of the
application, STUK holds the view that the pro-
posed disposal concept and site have good poten-
tial for complying with the requirements for long-
term safety. Getting confirmed of the long-term
safety requires, however, substantial further re-
search and development efforts, which are
planned to be carried out during the forthcoming
period e.g. at the selected disposal site.
STUK’s preliminary safety appraisal is sup-
ported by a number of expert review reports and
statements, which are appended to this document.
In their statements, four research institutes which
have participated in the publicly financed waste
management research program state that, in the
domain of their expertise, no facts have appeared
indicating that the proposed disposal concept
would not meet the safety requirements. STUK’s
international review group deems that from the
safety point of view, the DiP should not rejected.
STUK’s own review work has neither revealed
any facts leading to a conclusion that the provi-
sions of the Government Decision (478/1999) are
not fulfilled.
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Posiva has recently published a performance as-
sessment TILA-99 [Vieno and Nordman, 1999]
which, together with supporting research and site
characterisation reports, provides support to their
application to the Finnish Council of State for a
Decision in Principle regarding a final disposal
facility for spent nuclear fuel [Posiva, 1999].
The Decision in Principle will be decided upon
in the year 2000 on the basis that:
• Disposal is of overall benefit to Finnish socie-
ty;
• A host municipality is in favour;
• Such facts have not arisen which show that
there are not sufficient prerequisites to con-
struct a safe nuclear facility.
The municipality of Eurajoki, which contains the
Olkiluoto site, has indicated that it is willing to
accept a repository.
The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Au-
thority (STUK) has formed an External Review
Group in order to assist with their response to the
Decision in Principle application. The Group was
selected so as to cover the range of scientific and
technical disciplines that form the basis of the
Posiva submission. The members of the group are:
• Mick Apted, Monitor Scientific, USA;
• Neil Chapman, QuantiSci, UK;
• Shaun Frape, University of Waterloo, Canada;
• Fred Glasser, Aberdeen University, UK;
• Bertil Grundfelt, Kemakta Konsult, Sweden;
• David Hodgkinson, Quintessa, UK;
• John Hudson, Rock Engineering Consultants,
UK;
• Geoffrey Milnes, GEA Consulting, Sweden;
• Karin Pers, Kemakta Konsult, Sweden;
• David Read, Enterpris, UK.
This report provides a consensus of the views of
the External Review Group at their meeting at
STUK on the 9th and 10th September 1999. The
individual, detailed review comments of the Group
are also documented separately
The review considers the following questions:
• First, is the information presented, including
the TILA-99 performance assessment and sup-
porting research, adequate for the Decision in
Principle?
• Given the results of this first evaluation, are
there areas where Posiva should develop their
performance assessment methodology and re-
search programme in preparation for the Pre-
liminary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR) in
the year 2010?
• What are the implications for STUK?
The structure of this consensus statement is as
follows. Section 2 considers the Posiva safety
concept and research within an international con-
text. Some specific issues arising from TILA-99
and supporting research are considered in Section
3, whereas the choice of Olkiluoto as the preferred
site is discussed in Section 4. On the assumption
that the Decision in Principle is positive, Section 5
makes some recommendations for the Posiva pro-
gramme over the ten-year period to the Prelimi-
nary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR). Finally,
some implications for STUK are presented in
Section 6.
1 INTRODUCTION
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The Posiva safety concept, which envisages the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel in high integrity
containers surrounded by low-permeability ben-
tonite within a deep geological repository, con-
forms to an international consensus for the final
management of highly radioactive spent fuel
wastes [NEA, 1999]. In particular, the Posiva ap-
proach is based on and follows closely the KBS-3
concept [SKBF/KBS, 1983] that has been studied
intensively for almost two decades without any
major problems emerging. With this background,
the External Review Group is of the opinion that
the Posiva safety concept is fundamentally sound
and is based on high quality science and engineer-
ing which is in keeping with the best international
practice.
Specifically, the External Review Group en-
dorses the following safety features, which form
part of the TILA-99 performance assessment.
There is a general consensus that the copper/
iron canister acting in conjunction with the ben-
tonite buffer could provide containment of radio-
nuclides for at least hundreds of thousands of
years provided that:
• Canisters are free from initial defects;
• Near-field geochemical conditions (Eh, pH,
anions, salinity) remain stable following seal-
ing and resaturation of the repository;
• Transport of corrodants in the buffer remains
diffusive;
• The near-field rock remains mechanically sta-
ble.
Furthermore, given a stable and reducing near-
field environment there is agreement that follow-
ing degradation of the canister and consequent
canister failure, radionuclides will be released
only slowly into the geosphere by virtue of the:
• Slow dissolution rate of the spent fuel matrix;
• The low solubility of many key radioelements
under reducing conditions;
• The limited abundance of highly soluble radio-
nuclides in the inventory;
• Slow diffusion and retardation in the bentonite
buffer;
• Physical filtration by the bentonite buffer act-
ing to prevent any radio-colloid migration from
the spent fuel to the host rock;
• The likelihood of limited failed canister sur-
face area in any initially defective canisters.
The geosphere is expected to provide a generally
stable chemical and mechanical environment pro-
tecting the near field, in addition to providing
physical isolation of the waste from the future
activities of people. The potential role of the geo-
sphere in retarding the migration of radionuclides
is likely but difficult to prove. It is noted that
TILA-99 considers a number of variant scenarios
that take little credit for this potential barrier
function. Finally, radionuclides reaching the bio-
sphere may be subject to net dilution before enter-
ing the food chain or appearing along alternative
exposure pathways.
It is also noted that the overall system of safety
barriers has a significant element of resilience to
dynamical changes and uncertainties. Thus, it is
the consensus of the External Review Group that
the long-term, safe isolation of spent nuclear fuel
should be robustly assured by the Posiva design
over a wide range of anticipated future conditions.
As regards the presentation of the safety case,
Posiva are to be commended on the aims of TILA-
99 to be robust, transparent, traceable and repro-
ducible. Posiva has also successfully conducted a
policy of incrementally improving the safety as-
sessment through iteration, for example from
TVO-92 [Vieno et. al., 1992] and TILA-96 [Vieno &
2 THE SAFETY CONCEPT—
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
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Nordman, 1996] to the present report. TILA-99
represents a competent and pragmatic approach
to safety assessment, and reviewers familiar with
the performance assessment approach agreed that
it is a well-presented report that generally out-
lines the issues clearly and in a sufficient level of
detail to enable the reader to follow the reasoning
easily. The supporting reports are also clear and
well written, and, in some areas (particularly site
hydrochemistry), are at the leading edge of under-
standing and interpretation. This has resulted in
safety assessment documentation that is in line
with the best international practice [NEA, 1997].
However, the documentation is not particularly
accessible to non-specialists, including the general
public, who need to be convinced of the argu-
ments. Thus there is a case for producing a
further report directed to this audience.
In summary, comparison with international
practice has not revealed any reasons why a safe
repository for spent fuel could not be constructed
in Finnish bedrock and, from this point of view, it
can be recommended that a Decision in Principle
is taken to continue with the repository develop-
ment programme. However, as discussed in the
following sections, the detailed review has high-
lighted a number of issues where, granted a Deci-
sion in Principle, Posiva would need to focus effort
if the programme is to go forward satisfactorily.
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Notwithstanding the overall positive view of the
Posiva safety concept expressed in Section 2, the
External Review Group has a number of com-
ments at various levels of detail on TILA-99, the
most important of which are summarised below.
These have implications for the safety assessment
work and research that will need to be conducted
following an approval of the Decision in Principle.
Canister failure scenarios
The canister failure scenarios considered in TILA-
99 were of the “what if…” type in which a small
defect was postulated or the canister is assumed
to disappear completely. In the future, the Exter-
nal Review Group believes that this bounding ap-
proach should be augmented by a more detailed
scientific approach, both within the safety assess-
ment and in terms of evaluating scenarios based
on natural processes that could potentially lead to
a loss of integrity of the canister/buffer system.
Examples where a more detailed evaluation is
called for are:
• Evolution of pinhole defects into larger discon-
tinuities, for example due to the expansion of
corrosion products of the inner cast iron insert;
• Estimation of manufacturing defects in canis-
ters, especially associated with the welding or
closure of the outer copper vessel, including
frequency, dimensions and variability;
• Common mode failure of a number of canisters,
for example due to fracture movement as a
consequence of post-glacial earthquakes [La
Pointe & Wallmann, 1997];
• Multiple canister analysis, taking account of
the range of flow parameters arising from
evaluation of spatial variability in rock hydrau-
lic properties (see later section);
• Corrosion of copper including welded seals,
taking account of: (i) potential complexants
including those in materials introduced into
the repository, (ii) mixed corrosion product for-
mation e.g. Fe-U-Cu, (iii) the local gas regime
after perforation, (iv) salinity.
Buffer failure scenarios
The buffer is a key barrier for both assurance of
longevity of copper canisters and in controlling
subsequent radionuclide release to the far field.
As such, it is an important barrier to evaluate.
TILA-99 examines the performance of the buff-
er largely through a mass transfer coefficient
approach, using a lumped term QF that is a func-
tion of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) di-
mensions, fracture spacing and flow rates, and
effective diffusion coefficient of the buffer (which
depends on salinity). Transparency is somewhat
lost by using this lumped approach and apparent-
ly using single discrete values for the derived QF
for each candidate site. Clearly the data on flow
rate and fracture spacing at any one site show
significant spatial variability that calls into ques-
tion the use of single values. The same may be
true with respect to salinity variations. It is un-
derstood that the motivation for the TILA-99
approach is to help discriminate among candidate
sites. However, the impact of spatial heterogenei-
ty at a given site is somewhat masked by selection
of single parameter values to represent a wide
range of interacting processes.
With respect to “what if…?” scenarios for the
buffer, future consideration should address:
• Alteration and/or disruption of the bentonite
buffer, due to chemical, thermal and mechani-
cal effects, leading to enhanced corrosion of the
3 TILA-99
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canister as well as greater release rates of
radionuclides from the buffer to the host rock;
• Displacement and/or disruption of buffer by
the potential expansion of the massive inner
cast-iron insert of the canister;
• Relative movement of a canister and the sur-
rounding buffer, for example canister sinking
due to viscous flow of bentonite;
Rock mechanics
It is noted that the relatively high horizontal
stresses and relatively low rock strength at
Olkiluoto and Hästholmen could potentially lead
to stress concentrations, which could in turn cause
rock failure near the intersections of tunnels and
deposition holes. If so, then alternative design con-
cepts such as in-tunnel emplacement within ellip-
tical cross-section tunnels may need to be consid-
ered and their performance evaluated in detail.
In addition, the Group makes the following
recommendations with respect to future rock me-
chanical work:
• A technical audit should be carried out for a
structured list of information requirements, in
order to establish if the information is ade-
quate for the intended purpose;
• A Finnish rock mass classification scheme
should be produced to establish during excava-
tion whether the rock mass ‘quality’ is accepta-
ble for the disposal objective;
• A study of the parameters required for model-
ling the following phenomena should be carried
out: i) overall rock response to excavation, ii)
coupled rock mechanics and hydrogeology, iii)
thermo-hydro-mechanical (THM) interactions
and performance assessment;
• The Excavation Disturbed Zone (EDZ) should
be studied on a site-specific basis for both rock
engineering construction and as a potential
fast transport pathway;
• Estimates of the time dependence of repository
stability should be made, given that the design
life of a repository is far longer than the usual
120 years for civil engineering structures. Also,
laboratory measurements of parameters are
not sufficient for repository scale predictions,
as rock properties are scale dependent;
• There is no evidence that standardised meth-
ods for gathering and processing information
have been used, but such protocols are re-
quired for transparency, traceability and credi-
bility.
The significant differences in the values of the
principal stress components might also impact
upon postulated excavation, construction and em-
placement operations within a repository, and
these impacts will need to be addressed at the
appropriate time.
Avoidance strategies
The Posiva application for the DIP [Posiva, 1999]
mentions acceptability criteria for each disposal
hole in the tunnel floors as well as for the layout of
the whole repository. Two types of avoidance strat-
egies are used as arguments in TILA-99, related
to the identification and avoidance of negative fea-
tures during the construction of the repository and
selection of deposition holes. Firstly, it is assumed
that ‘fracture zones’ will be avoided during the
positioning of tunnels and deposition holes. This
is problematic at present because of the lack of
clarity in defining what is meant by ‘fracture
zone’. This argument may, however, be reinstated
if future research efforts make ‘fracture zones’ bet-
ter defined and practically identifiable, which
would make avoidance plausible. Secondly, it is
assumed in TILA-99 that highly transmissive frac-
tures will be avoided in the siting of deposition
holes. This is possible on a practical basis, but is
not admissible as part of the safety case because it
cannot be assumed that the present hydraulic na-
ture of a fracture will be retained over long peri-
ods of time (e.g. through an Ice Age and beyond).
With the possible uncertainties over design result-
ing from the in-situ stresses and rock strength
mentioned above, avoidance strategies are likely
to become an increasingly important issue.
This issue needs to be explored in more depth,
particularly as stringent criteria may result in an
increase in requisite rock volume for the reposi-
tory that could be more difficult to achieve.
46
S T U K - B - Y T O 1 9 8
APPENDIX STUK EXTERNAL REVIEW GROUP CONSENSUS REPORT
Spatial variability
The extensive hydrogeological data at all sites re-
veal a high degree of spatial variability. It is not
clear that the full extent of this can be fully incor-
porated within the concepts underlying the dis-
crete fracture flow modelling. Moreover, the major
impact of spatial variability is on transport rather
than flow, but TILA-99 does not attempt to quanti-
fy this. Instead, a uniform fracture approximation
is used with transport parameters that are
claimed to be conservative. However, this claim is
questionable in view of the upper cut-off limits
that were used for selecting hydraulic conductivi-
ties and transmissivities [Hautojärvi et. al., 1995].
Other forms of data treatment (extrapolation,
curve fitting) would also seem to have introduced
a degree of bias. This touches on the general prob-
lem of whether it is reasonable to represent such a
wide range of values (several orders of magnitude)
with a single representative value for modelling
purposes.
Geochemistry
High quality geochemical data have been obtained
from the sites but it has not been used to its full
potential in the TILA-99 safety assessment. For
example, the palaeohydrogeological interpreta-
tions of past climate states discussed in underly-
ing research reports do not appear to have been
considered. Confidence in the assessment would
be increased by taking into account geochemical
interactions and the evolving boundary conditions
resulting from climate change. At present, no jus-
tification or mechanistic basis is given for the sce-
narios chosen for analysis (e.g. ‘disappearing can-
ister’). The rationale behind these assumptions re-
quires further explanation.
Better-integrated data on mechanisms affect-
ing near-field geochemistry are required. These
should address the effects of adjunct materials
(e.g. cement, metals, and organics) and the possi-
bility of interaction of waste streams given the
presence of the low and intermediate level waste
repository at Olkiluoto.
Most of the shortcomings in the safety analysis
stem from the treatment of geochemical and hydr-
ogeological information. Over very long timescales
Posiva believe the repository will resemble a rich
uranium deposit and that its impact is likely to be
similar to natural U occurrences. However, this is
not the concept modelled in the TILA-99 safety
analysis where widespread dispersion is assumed
to the extent that the repository would be ‘virtual-
ly indistinguishable’ from its surroundings. Recog-
nition that the repository zone will always be
geochemically anomalous would be the first step
in constructing a more realistic safety case. This
should encompass calculations based on the
known geochemical behaviour of each radioele-
ment in keeping with the nuclide-specific release
constraints imposed by the regulators.
There is also an absence of a methodology for
selecting and checking thermodynamic data used
in the assignment of solubility values [Vuorinen
et. al., 1998], and this has resulted in some incon-
sistency between the safety assessment and the
sources cited. A more systematic approach to se-
lection, evaluation and documentation of chemical
data is suggested for the future.
Information on rock matrix diffusion at the
four sites is lacking. This raises questions con-
cerning the use of a ‘transport resistance’ concept
including parameters that have not been meas-
ured and are difficult to estimate.
It is noted that the ‘stacked water model’,
where waters of different ages are assumed to be
flushed downwards through the system, suggests
considerable rock mass permeability. It is not
clear whether this geochemical perspective is con-
sistent with the relatively low measured permea-
bilities.
Finally, the hydrochemistry of the rock matrix
has not been well characterised. This has the
potential to increase the salinity of the near-field
pore water, and should be studied further.
Microbiology
A more integrated, holistic view should be taken of
the potential for microbiological action during op-
erational and post-closure phases. Assessment
should include the impact of constructional mate-
rials, a potentially prolonged oxidative phase, and
impacts arising from gas generation and of gradi-
ents in pH, Eh, etc., as well as the potential for
nutrient transport.
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Traceability
As noted in Section 2, the reports are generally
well presented. Nevertheless, there are some
problems of data traceability, which make it more
difficult for the reader to assess some of the con-
clusions. This is particularly the case for the de-
velopment of the structural models from the site-
specific structural data. Also, it is difficult to see
the interface between the bentonite-to-rock trans-
fer coefficient values (QF) and flowpath transport
resistance values (WL/Q) presented in TILA-99
and the underlying information on these parame-
ters in the site scale and site-to-canister scale re-
ports. Consequently the choice of ranges in these
crucial values used in the safety assessment is not
as clear as it could be.
Biosphere dilution
The degree of biosphere dilution assumed in TILA-
99 does not appear to be conservative as claimed.
For example, it is an order of magnitude larger
than the 104 m3 per year assumed in SITE-94
[SKI, 1997] and the drinking water pathway is not
necessarily the most conservative [BIOMOVS,
1996]. Potential well dilution factors will depend
on the type of well considered and on whether a
single or multiple canister analysis is being car-
ried out. Different types of well may exist on the
site at different times in the future. It is to be
hoped that more sophisticated biosphere analyses
will be featured in the next round of Posiva per-
formance assessment development which address
these issues, among others. For example, it should
be acknowledged that biosphere processes also
have the potential to concentrate radionuclides.
Scenario selection and analysis
TILA-99 presents a good descriptive evaluation of
the future evolution of the natural environment of
a repository at each site, which outlines the main
potential impacts of glacial cycling over the next
hundred thousand years. However, it is rather dis-
appointing that the quantitative analysis and com-
putational scenarios do not build on this convinc-
ingly.
The cases analysed are not linked to the evolu-
tionary descriptions and thus it is not possible for
the reader to evaluate their real significance, and
important correlations can be lost. For example,
the ‘noben’ scenario (i.e. what if very poor ben-
tonite) concentrated on the effect of modifying the
mixing volume for released radionuclides, rather
than on the critical issue of the effect of a degrad-
ed diffusive barrier on canister lifetimes and the
diffusive constraint on radionuclide release rates.
A further example is the gas scenario, which
only looks at gas expulsion of radionuclides from a
canister, rather than asking the question about
what is actually likely to happen physically in a
canister and the buffer as gas is produced and
migrates. The issues ‘missed’ are the generation of
steel corrosion products (the source of the gas)
which may expand and increase the size of the
aperture in the canister, as well as displace and
disrupt the encompassing buffer layer. Thus a
more integrated approach to gas generation needs
to be taken in the future.
The approach to scenario development in TILA-
99 is not commensurate with the current state-of-
the-art, and would not be suitable for the PSAR
due in year 2010, which needs to demonstrate
compliance with the relevant regulations [Minis-
try of Trade and Industry, 1999]. For the PSAR
there needs to be a more systematic and compre-
hensive approach to scenario development, which
considers how various process system Features
Events and Processes (FEPs) and External FEPs
(EFEPs) interact to affect the performance of the
proposed repository.
Introduced materials and other wastes
The longer that repository excavations are left
open and ventilated, the more likely exchange can
occur in volatile components, such as H2O, O2, N2,
CO2, CH4, H2S. Exchange of such volatiles can, in
turn, promote various and possibly irreversible
mineral reactions. Together, these changes could
degrade the ability of the rock to effectively buffer
chemical conditions in the future. Possible future
consideration should be devoted to such scenarios
to examine if there are any significant impacts on
repository performance.
Various materials are likely to be introduced
into a repository during construction, for example
48
S T U K - B - Y T O 1 9 8
APPENDIX STUK EXTERNAL REVIEW GROUP CONSENSUS REPORT
rock anchoring systems, trunking for ventilation,
transport fuel and other infrastructure. While
much of this could be stripped out before closure,
some materials could remain and alter the Eh, pH
and complexant concentrations. For example, any
stray organic materials could lead to enhanced
microbiological activity.
A related problem is the disposal of reactor
operating and decommissioning wastes in proxim-
ity to, and as part of a spent fuel repository. These
and any remaining concrete seals could again
change the groundwater composition, for example
by creating a high pH plume, and adversely affect
the near-field barriers. At an appropriate stage in
the repository programme, these issues should be
assessed in detail.
Conservatism and key safety factors
There is a formal requirement for conservatism in
presenting a safety case expressed in Statute 478
[Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1999] and this
challenge has been adopted vigorously in TILA-
99. Whilst this is clearly a sensible approach for a
programme to take, in that safety is apparently
better assured, a priori system-wide conservatism
in selection of models and data can ultimately lead
to a smoothing or blurring of quantitative results
and a consequent lack of transparency in the un-
derstanding and presentation of realistic system
and sub-system behaviour. It can thus result in
the opposite of what is intended by the require-
ments. This is seen to some extent in TILA-99,
where it is difficult to identify clearly those com-
ponents of system performance that contribute
most to long-term safety. From the reviews car-
ried out by the External Review Group, it appears
that, once a canister is assumed to have failed, the
key safety factors are: size of the hole in the canis-
ter, release rates, solubilities, the transfer coeffi-
cient from bentonite to rock (QF), and well dilu-
tion.
Comparison with other assessments
It would have been valuable were TILA-99 to have
compared its approach, assumptions and results
with those of related assessments produced in oth-
er countries [NEA, 1997]. This would have illus-
trated better the stated conservatisms of this as-
sessment and highlighted any significant differ-
ences in approach. Also, it would have been useful
to have made a comparison with the safety assess-
ments for the existing shallow geological disposal
facilities at Olkiluoto and Hästholmen.
Retrievability
Statute 478 contains a requirement that wastes
should be retrievable and the Posiva application
for the Decision in Principle [Posiva, 1999] says
that retrieval can be implemented using available
technology. However, this is not discussed explicit-
ly in TILA-99 (although more recent work has
looked at this issue). Eventually, it would need to
be demonstrated in practice that this is indeed the
case, and that no design modifications that might
affect the design basis safety concept would be
needed in order to facilitate retrieval.
Overall implication of comments
Although the above comments may appear exten-
sive, this is largely a reflection of the breadth of
information and analysis required by an assess-
ment such as TILA-99, and of the need to ensure
focus, as a future programme goes site-specific.
None of the comments challenges the fundamen-
tal safety concept proposed by Posiva, or provides
grounds for refusing the Decision in Principle.
However, the comments do have implications for
the future Posiva and STUK programmes, and
these are discussed in Sections 5 and 6.
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The External Review Group has given some con-
sideration as to whether Olkiluoto is the best of
the four sites and whether it is a workable site.
Differences in geochemical evolution excepted, it
is difficult to distinguish between sites based sole-
ly on geological or hydrogeological characteristics
because (i) the characteristics of the four sites are
closely similar, especially if spatial variability
within sites is considered, and (ii) the low-permea-
bility buffer effectively mitigates the coupling be-
tween the performance of the engineered barrier
system (EBS) from the hydrogeology of a site. It
also is noted that there are no clear criteria for
preferring saline or non-saline sites, and that gla-
cial cycling between saline and fresh water at re-
pository depths at the coastal sites leads to fur-
ther complexities. However, the costs and non-nu-
clear environmental impacts of transporting spent
fuel clearly favour the coastal sites of Olkiluoto
and Hästholmen.
An important selection factor is whether a site
is large enough to accommodate all the projected
waste. In this context, it is not obvious from the
information provided whether wastes from addi-
tional reactors can be accommodated into the
geological structure at Olkiluoto or the other sites,
without some difficulty regarding ‘respect distanc-
es’ from important rock discontinuities. This is an
issue which needs to be explained and reviewed
more fully in the near future, taking into consider-
ation the following points:
• Section 14.4 of TILA-99 outlines some of the
layout problems that would be encountered at
each of the sites as a result of geological
structure, rock stresses and the variation of
rock strengths. However, there is no real dis-
cussion of the practical or performance assess-
ment implications of this. It would be useful to
know whether Posiva considers that any aspect
of the safety analysis would be sensitive to a
larger or more dispersed repository.
• If there is a real constraint on useful rock
volumes (particularly at Olkiluoto) then what
is the next option for Posiva if either the
existing waste projections or the extended pro-
jections cannot be accommodated? Would it be
a matter of building a second repository in the
same general area (i.e. within a few kilome-
tres) or would some other solution need to be
found?
• The rate of waste arisings over the next few
decades would also need to be taken into ac-
count. For the extended waste projections from
new reactors, it may be that a decision on how
to handle the additional waste volumes (if they
pose a practical problem at Olkiluoto) could be
postponed until many years into the future.
The implications of this need to be part of the
present review process.
• The implications of conceptual model uncer-
tainty arising from alternative geological struc-
ture interpretations and models of groundwa-
ter flow at Olkiluoto should be assessed.
On the basis of present evidence, Olkiluoto is
thought likely to be a workable site, with the fol-
lowing positive and negative attributes:
Positive attributes
• Reducing chemical conditions;
• Waste accommodated in a single repository
panel;
• Sea-borne transport of wastes to the site;
• Local acceptance;
• Large biosphere dilution for any released radi-
onuclides due to discharge to seabed for cur-
rent inter-glacial period;
4 OLKILUOTO
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• Low flow of saline water during current inter-
glacial period;
• Potential hydraulic shielding by sub-horizontal
zones;
• Evidence from VLJ repository suggests it is a
relatively low permeability site.
Negative attributes
• Relatively high horizontal rock stresses;
• Relatively low and anisotropic rock strength;
• Potential impact of saline water on backfill and
buffer;
• Uncertain hydrogeological evolution;
• Most complex hydrochemistry.
The Posiva programme has now reached the point
when it is not possible to learn a great deal more
without going underground and exploring the real
volume of rock in which a repository might be
located. If work goes ahead at Olkiluoto then it
will provide the opportunity to establish the varia-
tion in rock stresses and rock strengths, and re-
fine conceptual models of rock structure, ground-
water flow and of palaeohydrogeological evolution
of the site, that will increase confidence in calcula-
tions designed to scope its likely future behaviour.
Posiva should be encouraged to define how their
programme of work at the site will achieve both
these, and other, design-related objectives, before
the programme advances much further.
Posiva has suggested Hästholmen as a second
choice should Olkiluoto prove impractical. It is not
apparent that the choice can readily be based on
the geological evidence, although it is appreciated
that non-geological factors must also be given
high weighting. It is also not clear why only the
volume of rock beneath Hästholmen is considered,
rather than a broader area that may provide more
flexibility in repository location.
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It can be seen from the preceding discussion that
the External Review Group is in favour of approv-
ing a Decision in Principle for Posiva to continue
with its repository development programme at
Olkiluoto. However, there are several areas where
the Group feels that this approval ought to be
conditioned by specific requirements for Posiva to
carry out more research and development. Some
of this work is likely already to be in Posiva's
forward plans, but it is important, nevertheless,
for STUK to identify these issues clearly.
The External Review Group divided these is-
sues into three categories:
Category 1: Issues that should be clarified or
resolved in the near future (i.e. before locating
and driving the shaft and/or access tunnel)
using existing data;
Category 2: Issues that should be included as
points of focus within the Posiva R&D pro-
gramme and be resolved by 2010;
Category 3: Issues which Posiva should devote
resources to in further site characterisation
work at the surface or in the underground rock
characterisation facility at Olkiluoto.
It should be noted that some of the Category 3
issues also require addressing in the immediate
future. The issues identified within each of these
three categories are outlined below.
Category 1
Further explanation is required on the issue of
avoidance strategies (avoidance of adverse rock
conditions or geological structures) which would
allow a repository to be fitted into the rock mass of
the Olkiluoto site. This needs to address both the
basic structural geology of the site and the poten-
tial large variations in size of the repository, de-
pendent on the amount of fuel in the eventual
disposal inventory. To this end, it would be useful
if the structural data from the site could be re-
processes and interpreted by at least two different
and independent groups, and their implications
identified and quantified. This would also provide
an improved background for the development of
the Finnish rock mass classification scheme men-
tioned earlier.
As discussed above, it is not clear that the rock
stresses at potential repository depth, combined
with the available data on rock strength, would
allow flexibility in locating and constructing a
repository at Olkiluoto without the use of signifi-
cant support work or design modifications (e.g. in-
tunnel as opposed to KBS-3 type emplacement).
The implications of this on repository design and
performance need to be evaluated.
Owing to the difficulty in verifying the degree
of conservatism in TILA-99, it is necessary for
Posiva to explain more clearly which factors in
system performance are, realistically, most sensi-
tive and, hence, which features are the principle
supports of the safety concept. A dialogue with
STUK could be initiated to discuss the issue of
conservatism and its implications for deriving the
specified performance measures.
Category 2
A more sophisticated performance assessment
methodology should be developed and tested be-
fore the 2010 PSAR is submitted. This needs to
include treatment of the following matters:
• A more realistic approach to biosphere model-
ling which follows current international devel-
opments;
• More traceable data derivation, presentation
and management, in particular fuller explana-
tion of the component factors within lumped
performance terms, such as mass-transfer co-
efficients;
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR POSIVA
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• Improvement in the calculational capabilities
(e.g. explicit treatment of radionuclide decay
chains during transport) and flexibility of per-
formance assessment codes to approach the
current state-of-the-art;
• Systematic and comprehensive treatment of
alternative scenarios that gives particular at-
tention to possible failures or uncertainties in
key components of the repository that domi-
nate the safety case (e.g. intact buffer, long-
lived canister, constant-sized defects, stable
mechanical and chemical conditions of the site);
• Evaluation of buffer-degradation scenarios, in-
cluding possible expansion of corrosion prod-
ucts of the cast-iron insert and gas generation
within a waste container, on the performance
of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS). Simi-
larly, the effects of gas pressure on seals needs
to be evaluated;
• The impacts of time dependent, repeated or
cyclical processes need further consideration,
particularly in the period between ten thou-
sand and some hundreds of thousands of years
to account for glacial cycle effects;
• A more detailed analysis of canister degrada-
tion during the thermal period, particularly
with respect to impurities in the buffer which
may contribute corrodants;
• A fuller analysis of the various failure modes of
the canister, moving away from the constant
pinhole model to examine the potential for
time-evolution of the size of this initial manu-
facturing defect (for example related to iron
corrosion), and the use of multiple canister
analyses;
• The impacts of a requirement for waste retriev-
ability on the design and performance of the
system;
• The impacts of materials necessarily intro-
duced into the repository during construction:
grouts, cement and concrete/steel structures.
Further consideration should be given to the im-
pacts of saline waters (and cycling fresh and sa-
line waters) on the performance of the EBS and on
the glaciation-driven dynamics of the groundwa-
ter system located in a present-day coastal site.
The hydrogeochemistry interpretation and predic-
tions suggest that glacial and post-glacial events
can introduce a wide divergence of far-field/near-
field geochemical conditions.
Design alternatives for the EBS need to be
explored and related to growing knowledge of the
Olkiluoto site. In particular, the in-tunnel, ellipti-
cal cross-section, versus the TILA-99 in-borehole
design may need to be assessed in detail.
Category 3
Posiva should develop an Olkiluoto site character-
isation strategy and an underground experimen-
tal strategy soon, before the siting of a shaft.
These strategies need to include consideration of
the following issues:
• Defensible establishment of baseline hydrogeo-
logical and hydrochemical conditions before
construction begins to perturb the site;
• Better characterisation of the hydrochemistry
of the rock matrix and the dynamics of the
fresh and saline waters in the system;
• Development and testing of alternative concep-
tual models of the geological structure and
groundwater flow regime at the site;
• Characterisation of spatial variability in rock
mass hydraulic properties;
• In-situ rock stress measurements and tests/
demonstrations of alternative construction and
waste emplacement techniques, with emphasis
on the rock response to excavation.
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The External Review Group believes that there
should be a close interaction between STUK and
Posiva over the coming years, with well-identified
requirements and regular milestones to assist the
regulatory process. In addition, TILA-99 spells out
a number of challenges that STUK will need to
address in order to provide proper guidance to
Posiva. We deal with these first.
TILA-99, either directly, or by implication, can
be said to have brought into focus three main
areas where some regulatory consideration is
needed, well before any formal licensing submis-
sion is made. The first of these areas concerns the
formal requirement for conservatism in present-
ing a safety case, expressed in Statute 478 [Minis-
try of Trade and Industry, 1999]. Whilst this is
clearly a sensible approach, it can lead to a lack of
transparency, and may have an undesirable im-
pact on the Posiva assessment methodology in
that a proper description of expected system de-
velopment may not emerge clearly, and parame-
ters and values may be chosen which are acknowl-
edged to be unrealistic. It is not reasonable to
specify a defensible conservative case a priori
before the system has been adequately character-
ised and potential interacting effects have been
considered. It can thus result in the opposite of
what is intended by the requirements. STUK may
wish to give some thought and advice on how and
at what stage a reasonable degree of conservatism
can be incorporated in future assessments. Ideal-
ly, an attempt would first be made to represent
possible evolutions of the disposal system in order
to gain an understanding of critical issues, and
then a margin of safety could be introduced.
Secondly, further consideration needs to be
given to the most appropriate safety indicators at
times beyond about ten thousand years into the
future. The averaging of release concentrations
over long periods may not be the most appropriate
way of evaluating the impacts of future environ-
mental changes that occur with much shorter
periodicity.
The third area concerns the treatment of hu-
man intrusion into a repository. It is widely ac-
knowledged (as noted in TILA-99) that it is inap-
propriate to compare possible radiological impacts
of intrusion to standards designed to regulate for
the undisturbed evolution of the system. A regula-
tory position needs to be adopted on how to weigh
the significance of intrusion impacts when making
decisions about aspects of repository acceptability.
Such a position needs to be developed within an
international framework, and in a broader envi-
ronmental and social context of decision making
than that simply of radioactive waste disposal,
and STUK may wish to consider how to approach
this.
Each of these matters might affect the future
direction of STUK's own R&D programme to de-
velop its regulatory capabilities.
STUK may wish to keep closely abreast of the
Posiva programme so that it can act expeditiously
when called upon to express a regulatory view.
This could also help to ensure that, when formally
called upon to do so in several years time, surprise
issues are less likely to emerge and cause prob-
lems on all sides. In order to accomplish this,
STUK may wish to consider establishing a regular
review process with Posiva. Components of such a
formal process might include:
• Written clarification of (for example) Category
1 issues;
• Review of Posiva’s site characterisation pro-
gramme forward plans (before shaft construc-
tion begins);
• Review of Posiva’s underground experimental
programme forward plans (before shaft con-
struction begins);
• Regular (e.g. every three to four years) review
of the content and achievements of Posiva’s
R&D programme (equivalent to the reviews of
6 IMPLICATIONS FOR STUK
54
S T U K - B - Y T O 1 9 8
APPENDIX STUK EXTERNAL REVIEW GROUP CONSENSUS REPORT
SKB's RD&D programme [SKB, 1998a,b]);
• Review of interim safety analyses, prior to
PSAR, to track the development of the Posiva
performance assessment methodology;
• Implementation of key elements of an inde-
pendent assessment capability (e.g. scenario
development) to increase public confidence in
the decision for repository construction.
The objective of each of these items would be to
ensure that STUK's own regulatory concerns are
being taken into account by Posiva as their pro-
gramme develops. This approach would clearly
place additional demands on Posiva in terms of
production of documents that would need to be
considered in the context of the national disposal
programme.
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